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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, forty-six jurisdictions have made efforts
to protect rape victims from the humiliation of public disclosure
of the details of their prior sexual activities. In most states the
legislatures have passed shield laws restricting a criminal defendant's
ability to present to the jury evidence of past sexual history.' In
one instance, the same result has been reached by an appellate
court ruling.2 Late in 1978, the United States Congress followed
this trend and enacted rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3
While these laws vary in scope and procedural details, they share
the features of declaring an end to the presumptive admissibility of
such evidence and of restricting the situations in which a defendant
will be allowed to bring the victim's sexual history to the attention
of the jury. Almost unanimously, the literature of the last few
years has encouraged these laws and attempted to justify any adverse
consequences to the defendant by claiming that the state's interest
in protecting rape victims is sufficiently important to overcome
any constitutional objections.4 The changing moral climate in
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1 Rape victim shield laws are "aimed at eliminating a common defense strategy
of trying the complaining witness rather than the defendant. The result of this
strategy was harassment and further humiliation of the victim as well as discour-
aging victims of rape from reporting the crimes to law enforcement authorities."
State v. Williams, 224 Kan. 468, 470, 580 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1978).
See Appendix, infra, for a list of state statutes as they existed in the fall of
1979. Forty-five states had some sort of statute relating to the admissibility of
evidence concerning the sexual conduct of rape complainants.
2 In State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976),
the state supreme court declared that evidence of a rape victim's character for
chastity would, subject to limited exceptions, be inadmissible.
3 The Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540,
92 Stat. 2046 (1978), was passed on October 28, 1978 and, as FED. R. EviD. 412,
became effective 30 days later.
4 See sources collected in note 22 infra.
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this country and the increasing leniency about sexual relationships
outside of marriage, it is usually argued, have discredited the old
rationale that the unchastity of a woman has a material bearing on
whether she has really been rapedY
The new laws do not, however, merely end an antiquated rule
of evidence; they establish a new rule in some cases as extreme as
the old one. Statutes such as rule 412 create a presumption that
the sexual history of a rape victim will never be admissible, except
when compelled by due process because of overwhelming proba-
tive value. It is, of course, difficult to argue with the position that
the old rule of automatic admissibility should have been eliminated.
It is not as easy to say that it is wise or consistent with the rights of
a criminal defendant automatically to prevent introduction of evi-
dence of a rape victim's sexual history.
The premise of the first part of this Article is that evidence of
a rape victim's sexual history may be probative of an issue material
to determining the guilt of a defendant charged with rape. Later
sections of the Article will discuss particular circumstances in which
such evidence is relevant and necessary to the effective presentation
of the accused's defense. Initially, this Article will evaluate the new
rules in light of the sixth amendment rights of a defendant to con-
front the witnesses against him and to produce witnesses in his
favor. An analysis of laws affecting criminal defendants must be
approached not from the standpoint of the victim, but from the
standpoint of the accused. Whatever indignities are suffered by the
complaining witness in any criminal trial, they do not compare
with those a convicted defendant must suffer. There is no more
serious undertaking of the state than accusing a person of a crime,
with the concomitant threat of loss of liberty or life.
We reluctantly conclude that some rape victim shield laws
violate the sixth amendment right to defend oneself. In the at-
tempt to protect the sensibilities of rape victims, the defendant's
right to present evidence to the jury is infringed. Surely the rights
of defendants charged with rape are no less important or protected
than the rights of defendants accused of other crimes. To the extent
that a defendant in a rape case is categorically prevented from offer-
ing types of evidence that other criminal defendants may offer, his
sixth amendment rights are violated.
5 See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLum. L. REv. 1, 15-22 (1977); Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar
Sexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character for Chastity, 63 CoRNsEL
L. REv. 90, 97-102 (1977).
1980]
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
At common law, the rules governing the use of a rape com-
plainant's sexual history provided that such evidence was always
admissible.6 Three elements combined to create the rule of ad-
missibility. The first was the fear of false charges brought by vindic-
tive women. Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King's
Bench, stated that rape "is an accusation easily to be made... and
harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent." T
Second was the concept that chastity was a character trait. If a
woman could be shown to be unchaste by nature, then it could be
inferred that she had consented to sex with the defendant. Third
was the belief that premarital sex was immoral. Acts of previous
illicit sexual relations, like other acts of moral turpitude, could
thus be used to impeach the credibility of the complaining witness
in a rape case.8
The fear expressed by Sir Matthew Hale, that it is difficult to
defend against fabricated rape charges, pervaded the early writings
justifying the need for sexual history evidence.
The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds . . .ex-
pression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of
which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the
surface the narration is straightforward and convincing.
The real victim, however ... is the innocent man; for the
respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a
wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible
tale.9
To protect these innocent men, juries were usually instructed to
scrutinize closely the testimony of a rape complainant: "Where the
complaining witness and the defendant are the only witnesses, a
6 It has been argued that the early laws about rape and rape evidence reflected
a prevailing moral climate in which women were expected to be chaste until mar-
riage. The laws developed not as much from a chivalrous need to protect women,
however, as from a male need to protect his own property. A woman was damaged
if not a virgin-hence the severe penalties for a man who caused such damage.
This historical view explains the dichotomy between the high value placed on vir-
ginity and the extreme difficulty a woman faced in proving a rape charge. See
Gold & Wyatt, The Rape System: Old Roles and New Times, 27 CATH. U. L. REV.
695, 696-705 (1978). See also sources collected in Ireland, Reform Rape Legisla-
tion: A New Standard of Sexual Responsibility, 49 COLO. L. REv. 185, 185 n.1
(1978). Cf. Griffith, Rape: The All-American Crime, RAMPARTS, Sept., 1971, at
26, 30 (chivalry meant protecting only the virtuous woman; once defiled she no
longer deserved protection).
7 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CRoWN 634 (1st American
ed. Philadelphia 1847) (1st ed. London 1736). See Berger, supra note 5, at 21.
S E.g., Seals v. State, 114 Ga. 518, 520, 40 S.E. 731, 732 (1902).
9 3A J. WIOMOnE, EVIDENCE § 92 4a (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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charge of rape is one which, generally speaking, is easily made, and
once made, difficult to disprove. Therefore, I charge you that the
law requires that you examine the testimony of the prosecuting
witness with caution." 10 Dean Wigmore went so far as to urge that
all women who brought rape charges undergo psychiatric examina-
tion before being allowed to testify in order to weed out charges
stemming from sexual fantasy, rather than fact."
Whatever the situation may have been in times past, it is diffi-
cult to argue today that the danger of false charges is greater for
rape than for any other kind of crime.'2 If anything, the statistics
show just the opposite. Rape is one of the most underreported
crimes.'3 In addition, rape allegations are carefully screened in
most instances to assure that only legitimate cases go to trial. For no
other category of crime is the scrutiny by the police and prosecutor
closer.'4
Most states today do not have a rule automatically allowing the
use in rape trials of testimony about a woman's "character" for
chastity.15 Not long ago, however, courts reasoned that most women
lo D. AAONSON, M.itLND CnIMInAL JuRY INSTRUCTIONS AND Co asmNTARY
§ 4.32 (1975). See BAn AssocimTIoN OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CRIvNAL
JuRy INSTUCnTONS FOR THE DismT r OF COLUmBiA § 101 (1966); V. I-M] r-n.,
ILLINois JURY INSTRUCnONS § 4535 (1951).
11 "No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the
female complainant's social history and mental makeup have been examined and
testified to by a qualified physician." 3A J. WIGmooE, EVIDENCE § 924a (Chad-
bourn rev. 1970) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Although Wigmore's
position is untenable as a general rule in rape prosecutions, psychiatric testimony
should be allowed when there is an actual indication that the charges stem from
fantasy. Berger, supra note 5, at 68-69. See People v. Mandel, 61 App. Div. 2d
563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978) (mental condition of complainant found relevant);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1977) (amended 1979) (expressly allowing such
psychiatric testimony, the only state to so provide).
12 Cf. Comment, Police Discretion and the Judgment That a Crime Has Been
Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 277, 280-81 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Police Discretion] (observing that in Philadelphia approximately one
out of every five rape reports was determined to be unfounded upon police investi-
gation).
13 It has been estimated that the actual number of rapes is 33s times greater
than the number reported, a larger disparity than for any other crime. PREsmENT's
CommrsssIoN ON LAw ENFOcEMENT AND ADnMINSTRATioN OF JuSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FnEE SocIETY 21-22 (1967). Others have suggested that
the number of rapes is actually ten times the number reported. Berger, supra note
5, at 5; Griffin, supra note 5, at 27. Cf. Wittels, What Can We Do About Sex
Crimes?, SAT. EvENING PosT, Dec. 11, 1948, at 30, 31 (according to some psychia-
trists, only one out of twenty rapes is reported).
14 See Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 1, 27 n.109 (1976). Cf. Police Discretion, supra note 12, at 317-21
(suggesting that police investigative procedures are, in some respects, inadequate).
15 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Baldwin 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:498 (West 1975); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1977); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.015 (Vernon 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (1977). See Appendix,
548 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
were virtuous by nature and that an unchaste woman must there-
fore have an unusual character flaw. This character trait had
caused her to consent in the past (when, obviously, a "normal"
woman would never have consented) and made it likely that she
would consent repeatedly. Because consent was a defense to rape,
evidence that was thought to show a propensity towards sexual re-
lations was always admissible to suggest consent in the particular
instance.' 6 Courts and legislatures have adapted to the times and
have realized that a woman who is unchaste-or in modem parlance,
who has had extramarital sexual relationships-is no more likely to
consent indiscriminately than is a chaste woman.
Another problem that led to dissatisfaction with viewing sexual
history as evidence of character was the manner of proof. Char-
acter is usually proved by testimony about a person's reputation
and less often by opinion testimony or by evidence of specific acts. 17
Thus, in rape cases, the defendant was entitled to introduce testi-
mony about the sexual reputation of the victim and could often
have a witness testify to his opinion of the woman's chastity. Even
if there is some probative value in showing that a rape victim is
casual in her selection of sexual partners, the least accurate way of
doing so is by evidence of her reputation or the opinion of one wit-
ness perhaps lacking any personal knowledge.'
8
infra. Cf. State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 26-27, 545 P.2d. 946,
950 (1976) (majority of states allows character evidence, but limits its scope when
defense of consent is raised). But see, e.g., Wright v. State, 527 S.W.2d 859,
862-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (accused in cases in which consent is asserted as
defense may show the prior unchaste character of the complainant).
16 "The previous conduct of the prosecutrix, as to whether or not she had
connection with other men, is a proper subject of inquiry, as tending to show a
want of chastity, and therefore that she would be more likely to consent than a
virtuous woman .... ." S. MAXwELL, CanvmqAL P]RocanraE 248 (1896).
This practice conflicted with the general rule that proof of character was not
permitted to show that someone acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion.
See McCoaxbcK's HANmBooK OF THE LAW OF EviDENcE. § 188 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972) [hereinafter cited as McComvarcx]. That rule had exceptions other than
sexual history evidence: proof by an accused of his good character; witness im-
peachment by showing bad character for truthfulness; and character for aggression
of deceased in a homicide. Id. §§ 188, 191-194.
17 See 3A J. WIGoMRE, Evm-ncE § 920 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). In rape cases,
the victim's moral character was proven almost exclusively by evidence of her
reputation, 7 J. WicmoRE, EvmaNc. § 1985 (1940), although opinion testimony
of her unchaste character was at least theoretically permissible in a few states.
See, e.g., State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907) (permitting
opinion testimony to prove the accused's character). Cf. FED. R. Evm. 4 0 5 (a):
"In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is
admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in
the form of an opinion." The rule allowing opinion testimony was a marked
departure from the common American rule.
18 See People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223 (1856) ("I cannot understand why,
upon any sound rule, general reputation should be preferred to particular facts.").
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Sensing the inherent weaknesses of relying on the character-evi-
dence rationale for admitting sexual history evidence, some courts
attempted to justify it on the ground that it impeached the com-
plainant's credibility. 19 This reasoning assumes that promiscuity is
a form of dishonesty, and that, as in the case of other acts affecting
honesty, promiscuity lessens the witness's credibility. This effort
to justify admitting evidence of sexual history is seriously flawed.
First, the cases offering this explanation limited the inference to
women. Promiscuous men could not be similarly impeached.
20
Second, only women who brought rape charges were open to this
kind of impeachment. Female prosecuting witnesses who charged
defendants with other types of crimes, such as robbery, could never
be impeached by their prior sexual history.
21
In recent years, many law review articles and notes have at-
tacked the old rule allowing evidence of the victim's previous sexual
conduct in a rape trial.22  They argue that this system is manifestly
19E.g., Seals v. State, 114 Ga. 518, 40 S.E. 731 (1902); Anderson v. State,
104 Ind. 467, 471, 4 N.E. 63, 65 (1885); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 753, 35
N.W.2d 816, 822 (1949); CAL. Evm. CoDE § 782 (West 1974); DEL. CoDE ANN.
tit. 11, § 3508 (1975). But see 2 J. BISHOP, CrnomiAL PRocEnuRE § 965 (1880)
("The evidence is sometimes regarded as properly impairing her credibility-a
doubtful proposition .... ").
2 0 E.g., State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 531, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (1895):
[S]uch evidence is inadmissible in any case for the purpose of impeaching
the character of a male witness .... It is a matter of common knowledge
that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest
degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, while
it does that of a woman.
Contra, People v. Blagg, 267 Cal. App. 2d 598, 73 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1968) (convic-
tion in homosexual rape case reversed because the trial judge refused to allow the
defendant to cross-examine the victim about his prior sexual conduct); Lucado v.
State, 40 Md. App. 25, 339 A.2d 398 (1975) (state allowed to prove sexual history
of male homosexual rape victim).
2 1 E.g., People v. Johnson, 106 Cal. 289, 294, 39 P. 622, 623 (1895). See
also Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 272 N.W.2d 320, 324-25 (Ct. App. 1978).
But cf. State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 28 P. 28 (1891) (allowing impeachment of a
witness to a murder on the ground that she was a prostitute).
22 Berger, supra note 5; Cold & Wyatt, supra note 6; Hibey, The Trial of a
Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent and Character, 11
AM. Cam. L. BEv. 309 (1973); Ordover, supra note 5; Washburn, Rape Law:
the Need for Reform, 5 N.M. L. REv. 279 (1975); Note, The Victim in a Forcible
Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. Citm. L. REv. 335 (1973); Note, Rape
Reform Legislation: Is It the Solution?, 24 CEv. ST. L. REv. 463 (1975); Note,
California Rape Evidence Reform, 26 HAsnNGs L.J. 1551 (1975); Note, Indicia of
Consent? A Proposal for Change to the Common Law Rule Admitting Evidence of
a Rave Victim's Character for Chastity, 7 Loy. Cm. L.J. 118 (1976); Note, The
Admissibility of a Rape Complainant's Previous Sexual Conduct: The Need for
Reform, 11 NEw ENG. L. REv. 497 (1976); Comment, Rape Evidence Reform in
Missouri: A Remedy for the Adverse Impact of Evidentiary Rules on Rape Victims,
22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 367 (1978); Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented
Again: A Legal Fallacy in Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 127 (1975);
Note, Criminal Law Reform in Vermont: The Proposal to Exclude Evidence of the
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unfair to women and a reflection of outmoded morality and an
unenlightened male-dominated legal system. The growing aware-
ness of the equality of women, and no doubt the published criticism,
have caused most jurisdictions in this country to change the old laws
and eliminate the automatic admissibility of this kind of evidence.23
Yet even as the old laws were premised on the myths of a male-
dominated society, the vituperative attacks and much of the result-
ing legislation are themselves based on an emotional premise: that
the rape victim is unfairly subject to a "second rape" by the criminal
justice system.24 Uniformly, the cry for revision of the rape evi-
dence laws calls for special protections for the rape victim not avail-
able to most prosecuting witnesses. Writers have gone so far as to
advocate considering a rape victim as a "defendant," entitled to the
same protections as defendants charged with crimes. 25
These authors are undoubtedly correct that the old laws that
singled out rape cases for special evidentiary rules were unwar-
Victim's Character in Forcible Rape Cases, 1 VT. L. REv. 215 (1976); Note, The
Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11 WmLAmETTE L.J. 36 (1975);
27 BA LOR L. .Ev. 362 (1975); 15 DuQ. L. REv. 155 (1976); 52 WASH. L. REv.
1011 (1977).
23 See Appendix, infra, for list of states with rape victim shield laws. The
recent enactment of these statutes is an indication of the trend in contemporary
law to treat rape cases the same as other criminal trials. Special rules requiring
corroboration of a rape complainant's testimony are being eliminated. E.g., CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-68 (West 1972), repealed by 1974 Conn. Pub. Acts 74-131;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772(c) (1975), repealed by 59 Del. Laws ch. 547
(1974); IowA CoDE ANN. § 782.4 (West 1973), repealed by 1974 Iowa Acts ch.
1271, § 2; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-15 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.15 (McKin-
ney 1973), repealed by 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 14, § 1; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AmN.
§ 3106 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); WAsH. 1Emv. CODE AN . § 9.79.150(1) (West
1975). Jury instructions singling out prosecuting witnesses in rape trials for special
scrutiny are also falling into disuse. See, e.g., People v. Ricon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d
864, 877, 538 P.2d 247, 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 128 (1975) (Striking down jury
instruction that required the jury to view a prosecutrix's testimony with caution,
the court noted that they were "of the opinion that the instruction . . . has out-
worn its usefulness and in modem circumstances is no longer to be given mandatory
application."); Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 865 (Wyo. 1976) (cautionary instruc-
tion "unnecessary"); MI-N. STAT. Ar. § 609.347(5) (West 1975); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 175.186 (1975). Cf. 18 PA. CoNTs. STAT. AwN. § 3106 (Purdon 1973)
(requiring such an instruction), repealed by 1973 Pa. Laws No. 115, § 2. Similarly,
many states are completely rewriting their laws of sexual crimes to eliminate the
disparaging treatment women have suffered. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-42-4-1
to 4 (1978); MIcH. CoM. LAws §§ 750.520a-5201 (1975); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 28.317-.321 (1977) (making sex offense law sex-neutral).
24 Gold & Wyatt, supra note 6, at 695; Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape
Case: A Feminist View, 11 Am. Cam. L. REv. 335, 343-51 (1973); Note, Indicia
of Consent? A Proposal for Change to the Common Law Rule Admitting Evidence
of a Rape Victim's Character for Chastity, 7 Loy. Cr. L.J. 118, 120 n.10 (1976).
25 See Cold & Wyatt, supra note 6, at 695-96. Cf. Ordover, supra note 5, at
108-09 (emphasizing confusion and prejudice to women inherent in present scheme
of rape prosecutions). This position is constitutionally ludicrous, see notes 98-102
infra & accompanying text.
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ranted. This thesis, however, cuts both ways: just as testimony
should not automatically be admissible in rape cases, it should not
automatically be inadmissible solely because a trial involves rape
instead of some other crime affecting the same people. A basic
premise of evidentiary rules is that they focus on issues common to
all trials and do not develop differently for each substantive crime
and civil cause of action.
26
III. THE MODERN RESPONSE
The response of legislatures to criticism of rape evidence laws
has been enormous. In recent years, forty-five states have rewritten
their rules of evidence concerning the admissibility of testimony
about a rape victim's prior sexual history.27 A majority of the new
evidentiary laws tend to the opposite extreme of the old rule of
automatic admissibility: presumptive inadmissibility.28 There is
great variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the extent to
which sexual history evidence is allowed. Louisiana has barred
all uses of prior sexual activity evidence, except evidence of a prior
relationship with the defendant, 29 while the Texas legislature has
rewritten its law simply to allow judicial discretion over all uses
of sexual history evidence. 30 Other states cover the range between
these two.
Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the most recent
such enactment, states as a general rule that reputation or opinion
2 6 See 1 J. WMoRE, EviEN E xiii-xix (1940). Cf. S.D. CoMiLED LAws
ANN. § 23-44-16.2 (1978) ("The testimony of the complaining witness in a trial for
a charge of rape shall not ... be treated in any different manner than the testi-
mony of a complaining witness in any other criminal case.").
2
7 See Appendix, infra.
2 8E.g., FED. R. Evm. 412 ("[E]vidence . . . is .. .not admissible, unless
.); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1103(2)(a) (West 1974) ("is not admissible"); CoLo.
BREv. STAT. § 18-3-407(1) (1975) ("shall be presumed to be irrelevant"); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1975) ("shall not be admissible"); S.C. CoDE § 16-3-
659.1 (1977) ("shall not be admitted . . . provided, however .... ."). Berger
proposes that the judge be given additional discretion to exclude evidence even in
those few areas in which her model statute allows the presumption to be overcome.
Berger, supra note 5, at 72. But see S.D. CoMpinD LAws ANN. § 23-44-16.2
(1978), quoted in note 26 supra.
2 9 LA. 11Ev. STAT. ANr. § 15:498 (West 1975): "Evidence of prior sexual con-
duct and reputation for chastity ... shall not be admissible except for incidents
arising out of the victim's relationship with the accused."
3OTxx. PENAL CoDE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon 1975): "Evidence of specific
instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual
conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct may be admitted
S. . only if, and to the extent that, the judge finds that the evidence is material to
a fact at issue in the case and that its ... prejudicial nature does not outweigh
its probative value."
1980]
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evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged rape victim is
never admissible, and that "evidence of a victim's past sexual be-
havior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admis-
sible." 31 The rule then follows the most common pattern, setting
forth a few specific instances in which the defendant's obvious need
to introduce such evidence is so great that preventing it would
violate due process. Congress chose two situations in which to allow
this evidence:
(A) [P]ast sexual behavior with persons other than the
accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether
the accused was . . . the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the al-
leged victim consented .... 32
Rule 412 is typical in a number of ways. First declaring a
general rule that evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual activities
is inadmissible, it creates a presumption that the defendant should
not be allowed to introduce testimony on this point. The rule rec-
ognizes, however, that in certain limited situations the defendant
may put such evidence before the jury; in some cases it would be
manifestly unfair to prevent introduction of evidence with par-
ticular probative value. As with most similar statutes, rule 412 is
restricted in its operation to criminal cases.33 It follows the majority
in allowing evidence of specific sexual acts only in very limited
situations,3 but it is more restrictive than most state rules by pro-
hibiting reputation and opinion evidence altogether, no matter what
the probative value.
Two instances of special admissibility appear most commonly
in state statutes: (1) prior sexual relations with the defendant offered
3 1 FED. R. EvD. 412(b).
321&d 412g(b) (2.).
33Id. 412(a). See Ar . STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.1 (1977); CAL. Evm. CoDE
§ 1103 (West 1975). This peculiar limitation, having nothing to do with the need
to protect rape victims, could lead to the anomalous result of sexual history evidence
being admissible in a civil suit for assault but inadmissible in the criminal prosecu-
tion for the same act, thus giving a civil litigant greater rights to present a defense
than a criminal defendant.
In many states, shield laws apply only in rape cases. E.g., IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-32.5-1 (Bums 1976) (amended 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon
1977). In at least one case, a court has therefore admitted sexual history evidence,
despite a shield law, in a case in which the defendant was charged with breaking
and entering with intent to commit rape. People v. Walker, 81 Mich. App. 202,
265 N.W.2d 82 (1978).
34 FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(2).
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to show consent; and (2) a specific sexual act with another man to
provide an alternative explanation for the physical indications of
rape. The rape evidence laws universally allow the defendant who
claims consent as a defense to show that he and the complainant had
a prior consensual sexual relationship. 5 Most statutes also permit
the defendant to rebut evidence offered by the state to corroborate
the sex act itself-presence of semen, resulting pregnancy or venereal
disease, or the force inflicted-by showing that such evidence may
have been the result of a sexual act with another man at about the
same time.86 Less common exceptions allow such testimony to
impeach the victim's credibility 37 or to show a motive for fabrica-
tion.3  Finally, the sexual behavior of the prosecuting witness may
be admissible if it indicates an unusual pattern of consensual sexual
activity that is closely related to the defendant's version of the events
leading to his claim of consent.39 There are a few other miscellane-
ous exceptions.40
Much of the debate about rape victim shield laws has centered
on the attempt to define precisely those situations in which fairness
and due process demand that the defendant be allowed to introduce
sexual history evidence. Professor Berger has written a comprehen-
sive article defining seven particular types of evidence that, subject
to judicial findings of relevance and fairness, the defendant ought
35 See Appendix, infra. Missouri requires that the conduct be reasonably con-
temporaneous. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015(1) (1) (Vernon 1977). Some states
permit only testimony concerning specific instances of conduct, e.g., MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 233, § 21B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978); N.Y. Cram. PNoc. LAW § 60.42
(McKinney 1975). For some reason, only evidence of prior sexual relations with
the defendant is usually admissible. Only one state specifically allows evidence
of subsequent consensual relations. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18.3-407(1) (a) (1975).
36 See Appendix, infra. Fan. R. Evnm. 412 allows testimony of sexual activities
to rebut evidence that defendant is the source of semen or injury, but not to rebut
evidence that he is the source of pregnancy or disease. The distinction is arbitrary.
No other jurisdiction uses it. Some states allow testimony related to the origin of
semen, pregnancy, or disease, but not physical injury. E.g., MicH. CoMI,. LAws
§ 750.520i (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (1977).
3 7E.g., CAr. EviD. CoDn § 782 (West 1974); Miss. CoDEy ANN. § 97-3-68
(1977). But see Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363 (1978).
3 sTwo states allow sexual history evidence to show bias or motive. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 461A (1977); On. REv. STAT. § 163.475 (1975). Two other states
allow evidence that the victim has previously filed false rape charges. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 972.11 (West 1975). In addition,
Colorado allows such evidence subject to a specific judicial finding of relevance.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1975). See State ex tel. Pope v. Superior Court,
113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976).
3 9 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §794.022(2) (West 1976); MqiN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.347(3) (West 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1977) (amended 1979).
40 N.Y. Chnm. PNoc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1975) (may prove that victim
was a prostitute); N.C. GErq. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1977) (amended 1979) (allows
testimony that victim fantasized the event).
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to be allowed to introduce.41 Other writers have argued that a man
accused of rape may delve into the victim's sexual history in far
fewer instances.
4 2
It is not the purpose of this Article to become involved in the
debate over which of these various situations brings the due process
clause into play and compels the admissibility of sexual behavior
evidence. Such an approach rests on the assumption that the state
has the constitutional authority to limit the defendant's introduc-
tion of evidence of the victim's sexual history. Berger, for example,
states as an axiom that legislatures have the power to bar certain
evidence as irrelevant and inadmissible in a trial and therefore can
completely exclude evidence of sexual behavior by declaring it
irrelevant. In marvelously circular reasoning, she cites the rape
shield statutes themselves as the only support for this proposition.4 3
She, like most other authors, then discusses how this power of the
state can be limited by the due process clause: in certain compelling
situations a court must allow the defendant to present testimony
excluded by statute.4
The power of the state to legislate is limited, however, by more
than due process concepts of fairness. Criminal defendants have
41 (1) Evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct with the defendant; (2)
evidence of specific instances of conduct to show that someone other than the
accused caused the physical condition (semen, pregnancy, disease) allegedly arising
from the act; (3) evidence of a distinctive pattern of conduct closely resembling
the defendant's version of the encounter, to prove consent; (4) evidence of prior
sexual conduct known to the defendant (presumably by reputation) tending to
prove that he believed complainant was consenting; (5) evidence showing a motive
to fabricate the charge; (6) evidence that rebuts proof offered by the state on
victim's sexual conduct; and (7) evidence as the basis for expert testimony that the
complainant fantasized the act. Berger, supra note 5, at 98-99.
42 E.g., Ordover, supra note 5, at 110-18 (distinctive patterns of behavior
under similar circumstances); Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis
of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1572 (1975) (only when victim's
testimony is sole incriminating evidence); 52 WASH L. REv. 1011, 1023, 1027-33
(1977) (bias and relations with the defendant only).
43 "Clearly, too, legislatures as well as courts may decide to bar some kinds of
proof, as indeed they have done in the area of rape by passing various shield
statutes designed to limit use of highly prejudicial material." Berger, supra note 5,
at 56-57.
Another writer has come up with the bizarre suggestion that a state can avoid
constitutional challenges by rewriting its laws of evidence. Washburn, supra note
22, at 302. But see notes 62-70 infra & accompanying text.
44 Berger states that banning entire categories of evidence offered by the
accused "poses issues of possible denial of due process." Berger, supra note 5, at
39. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150 (1976), which permits sexual conduct
evidence only when "its exclusion would result in denial of substantial justice to
the defendant." See also Rudstein, supra note 14, at 18-19; Comment, Ohio's New
Rape Law: Does It Protect Complainant at the Expense of the Rights of the
Accused?, 9 AiRoN L. Bxv. 337 (1975).
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been guaranteed numerous rights by the fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendments, and states may not infringe upon them regardless of
general legislative power. A state may decide in general that the
statements of a party to a lawsuit are admissible, but, because of the
protections of the fifth amendment, this determination cannot ex-
tend to statements coerced from a criminal defendant. 45 Although
the state may have the power to create a small claims court in which
civil disputes are settled without attorneys, that court cannot try
misdemeanor cases because of the sixth amendment guarantee of
counsel.46  The power to determine the admissibility of evidence
does not give the states the ability to permit introduction of evi-
dence seized in warrantless searches in violation of the fourth amend-
ment.47
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to confront witnesses against him and the right to obtain wit-
nesses in his own behalf. On its face a restrictive rape victim shield
law denies the defendant the ability to pursue certain questions on
cross-examination and to elicit testimony from his own witnesses.
For this reason, the analysis of such laws cannot start from the
assumption that a state may define this evidence as irrelevant.
Clearly the state could not constitutionally define all cross-examina-
tion as irrelevant without running afoul of the sixth amendment.
48
The question, then, is whether sexual history evidence may be
singled out and made inadmissible. To resolve this issue, the scope
of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights to introduce evi-
dence must be defined and that definition applied to sexual history
,evidence. If this analysis indicates that a defendant's right to pre-
sent evidence includes asking questions about the prior sexual ex-
periences of a rape victim, then the states will have a difficult time
defending their shield laws.
45 See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Cf. Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892) ("[Llegislation cannot abridge a constitutional
-privilege ... ").
46See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). But cf. Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367 (1979) (sixth amendment requires provision of counsel only if
indigent is to be sentenced to prison).
47Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291 (1973) (federal constitutional standard for what constitutes a "seizure" over-
rode the looser state definition of arrest).
48 "[I]t could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the clause if it
made all defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law." Washing-
ton v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967). See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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IV. THE SixTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor." 49 If a criminal defendant is to find a
constitutionally based right to present evidence of the prior sexual
behavior of a rape complainant, he must find it in this provision.
Such evidence can take two forms: the cross-examination of the
complaining witness and the introduction of testimony from inde-
pendent witnesses called by the defendant. The confrontation
clause controls the extent to which a defendant has the right to
cross-examine a witness who testifies against him, and the compul-
sory process clause is the basis for the right to present his own
witnesses.
It is axiomatic that the right of a defendant to confront the
witnesses against him includes the right of cross-examination. "The
substance of the [sixth amendment] constitutional protection is
preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing
the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a
cross-examination. This, the law says, he shall under no circum-
stances be deprived of .... ," 5 Cross-examination must be under-
stood to include the opportunities of "testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness" and also of giving the jury the
chance to view his demeanor.51 It is not merely limited to the right
to assure that the witness testifies to complete, rather than partial,
facts, nor is it limited to the substantive issues in controversy.52
The compulsory process clause assures a defendant the ability
to call witnesses in his own behalf. The right guaranteed is the
presentation of defense testimony, not merely access to the subpoena
power. It would be a hollow right indeed if a defendant could
49 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5OMattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895). The Court stated in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965), that "[i~t cannot seriously be doubted
at this late date that the right of cross-examination is included in the right of an
accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him." See Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Cameron v. State, 561 P.2d 118, 121 (Okla. Crim.
1977) ("scope of cross-examination should not be limited when testimony sought
... is germane to and has probative value in the matter on trial"). See generally
5 J. Wicmor, EVmENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. 1974); Westen, Confrontation
and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91
HAnv. L. REv. 567, 579-81 (1978).
51 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
52 See McCoMncK, supra note 16, at § 22 ("One of the main functions of
cross-examination is to afford an opportunity to elicit answers which will impeach
the [witness's] veracity, capacity to observe, impartiality, and consistency ....").
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subpoena a witness to the trial, but then had no right to elicit his
testimony.53
By considering these two clauses together, a unitary theory of
evidence for criminal cases emerges. This formulation, first pro-
pounded by Professor Westen,54 sees the two clauses as opposite sides
of the same coin-both give the defendant the right to present testi-
mony. The difference between them is that the confrontation clause
assures those rights during cross-examination of witnesses whose
testimony incriminates the defendant, and the compulsory process
clause guarantees the discovery and presentation of witnesses who
can establish a defense.55 According to Westen, the accused should
have the same right to have his evidence heard during cross-examina-
tion as he has during direct.56 Indeed, the sixth amendment as a
whole may be read as guaranteeing the defendant the right to pre-
sent this defense effectively: by cross-examining witnesses against
him, by presenting his own witnesses, by having an impartial jury
hear the evidence, by being told of the charges against him so that he
can prepare a defense, and by having the assistance of competent
counsel.57
Even accepting that the defendant has the right to present and
elicit testimony he hopes will exculpate him, the scope of that right
must still be defined. Surely it must be limited to issues involved
in the case. The sixth amendment speaks in terms of witnesses
53 Westen, supra note 50, at 591. In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23
(1967), the Court made clear that this right included the ability to present testi-
mony: "The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of
giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testi-
mony he had no right to use." But cf. United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237,
1240 (5th Cir. 1974) (compulsory process rights mean only that the witness must
be made available in court). For a detailed historical account of the development
-of the meaning of the compulsory process right, see Westen, The Compulsory
Process Clause, 73 MiCH. L. REv. 71, 75-107 (1974).
5 4 Westen, supra note 50.
5The difference between the two clauses does not depend on whether the
witness was called by the prosecution or the defense. Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 297-98 (1973). Rather, a defendant has the right to confront and
cross-examine any witnesses whose testimony is adverse and the right to present
and examine any who can provide helpful testimony. See Westen, supra note 50,
at 601-06.
66 Westen, supra note 50, at 592-93 (comparing confrontation clause and com-
pulsory process clause cases).
57 See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (confrontation and
compulsory process); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (impartial
jury); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948) (notice of charges against him). Cf. Lakeside v. Oregon,
435 U.S. 333 (1978) (sixth amendment does not guarantee that counsel will be
allowed to employ whatever strategy he wants); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970) (appoiniment of counsel only a few minutes before trial did not violate
the sixth amendment when record showed counsel did an adequate job).
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"against" the defendant and those "in his favor," and the Supreme
Court has never read either provision to mean that the defendant
'has the right to introduce whatever he wants. Rather, his right is
limited to evidence having some probative value.58
This is not meant to imply that there can be no limits to the
exercise of this right.5 9 Not all evidence with probative value is
admissible; under common law, otherwise relevant evidence may be
excluded if the probative value is outweighed by a prejudicial
effect.60
Neither logic nor the case law indicates that the defendant's
right extends beyond this01 The sixth amendment does not give a
criminal defendant any greater ability to introduce evidence than
other litigants, nor does it redefine the rules of relevance in criminal
cases. The issue with respect to rape victim shield laws, however,
is whether the defendant is entitled to introduce less than all rel-
evant evidence. May the defendant be prevented from offering
evidence that, properly or not, has traditionally been admissible?
In answering this question, it is unnecessary to go beyond the de-
fendant's right to introduce relevant, nonprejudicial evidence and
to argue that he can introduce all probative evidence.
Positing that the accused has the constitutional right to intro-
duce on direct and cross-examination relevant evidence not out-
weighed by prejudicial effect does not answer the issue. One ques-
tion remains: Who defines whether testimony is relevant and ad-
5 8
1n Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), the defendant sought to ask ques-
tions that would show possible bias of a state's witness, which the Court held was
"always relevant." Id. 316. In Wrashington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), the
Court held that the defendant had the right to establish a defense by presenting
a witness whose testimony "would have been relevant." Id. 16. See generally
Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 MicH. L. REv. 191, 205 (1975).
See Jenkins v. Moore, 395 F. Supp. 1336, 1338 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 513 F.2d
613 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding no violation of compulsory process rights when defend-
ant was denied the ability to introduce irrelevant documents). See also United
States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975);
United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566, 573 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 948 (1975); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1978).
Professor Westen suggests that this may be a final formulation of the rule,
rather than an interim one. The distinction turns on Westen's use of the word
"relevant" to mean "admissible." See note 116 infra & accompanying text.
59 Other sixth amendment guarantees are limited. For example, a defendant
is assured appointment of counsel, but only if he is sentenced to prison. Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The
accused's right to confront witnesses does not prevent use of prior testimony when
the witness is genuinely unavailable and there was prior opportunity for full cross-
examination. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
60 See FeD. R. EviD. 403; McCoRMIcK, supra note 16, at § 185, 6 J. W omopx-,
EvmrENCE § 1864 (Chadboum rev. 1976).
61 See note 58 supra.
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missible? If the Constitution assures no more than the right of a
defendant to present evidence that the state has determined to be
relevant, then the defendant cannot complain of a state law chang-
ing the rules to restrict certain types of evidence.6 2  The issue has
been put to rest by the Supreme Court. Because the ability of the
accused to present testimony is grounded in a constitutional right,
a federal constitutional standard applies.68 In Smith v. Illinois,64
a confrontation clause case, the Court held that a defendant could
elicit on cross-examination testimony that was relevant under tradi-
tional rules, notwithstanding a state evidentiary law to the con-
trary.65 Similarly, under the compulsory process clause, Washington
v. Texas 6 6 held that the sixth amendment rights of the accused
overrode a state rule preventing a codefendant from testifying in
favor of the defendant. 67 In these cases interpreting sixth amend-
ment provisions, the Court turned to the "federal common law"
for its evidentiary standards. State rules prohibiting testimony that
would have been admissible under "traditional" evidence law could
not act to prevent a criminal defendant from introducing such testi-
mony. In Davis v. Alaska,68 the Court stated that a witness prob-
ably would have given a different answer to a question propounded
on cross-examination had he not believed he was "shielded [by
state law] from traditional cross-examination." 69 Included in the
Court's phrasing of the right to cross-examine was the statement
6 2 Wigmore took this position with respect to the related issue of witness com-
petence. He argued that the compulsory process clause meant only that a defend-
ant could call such witnesses as were permitted under the local rules. J. WiGmoE,
EvimDmc § 2191 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
68 'The standard of relevance applied to the testimony of defense witnesses,
therefore, ultimately presents a federal question to be resolved by federal constitu-
tional standards." Westen, supra note 58, at 206. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385
U.S. 493, 498 (1967) (whether fifth amendment privilege has been waived is a
"federal question for us [the Court] to decide"); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
407-08 (1965) (denial of the right to cross-examine measured by federal standard);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892) (state legislation "cannot
abridge a constitutional privilege").
64390 U.S. 129 (1968).
65The Court followed Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), in applying a
federal standard. The Court held that the same standard had to apply under the
confrontation clause in both state and federal proceedings. Smith v. Illinois, 390
U.S. 129, 133 (1968). See Westen, supra note 50, at 579-80.
66388 U.S. 14 (1967).
67 In Washington, two state statutes prevented a defense witness from testify-
ing because he was a coparticipant in the crime. The Court held that the right to
compulsory process had been denied because the witness was otherwise competent
to testify. Id. 23.
68415 U.S. 308 (1974).
69 Id. 314. State law prohibited cross-examination regarding the witness's
juvenile record and probationary status.
1980]
560 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
that the cross-examiner "has traditionally been allowed to impeach,
i.e., discredit, the witness." 70 To say that a state has changed the
traditional law and declared evidence irrelevant thus does not
answer the constitutional question. Rather, the validity of such a
state statute must be tested against the traditional standard of
admissibility: the sixth amendment guarantees that a criminal de-
fendant will be able to introduce any evidence probative of a mate-
rial issue, unless the probative value is outweighed by the prejudi-
cial effect of the testimony.
V. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REvIEW
Having demonstrated that the accused has a constitutional
right to present relevant, nonprejudicial evidence, we now attempt
to set out the appropriate standard for reviewing a state statute
alleged to restrict the exercise of that right. From the numerous
criminal procedure cases decided by the Supreme Court appear two
general choices. In some cases, the Court has employed a totality
of the circumstances test, in which the legitimate interests of the
state are weighed against the constitutional rights of the defendant.7 1
This standard allows the state reasonably to regulate the trial process
as long as the defendant is not denied a fair trial. In other cases,
the Court has utilized a strict standard of review, under which even
minor restrictions on the defendant's rights are struck down.72
Many commentators who support rape victim shield laws have
assumed the balancing test to be appropriate. 73 The importance
of the state's interest must then be taken into account and weighed
against the defendant's right to introduce the evidence. For ex-
ample, cases involving eyewitness identification are reviewed under
70 d. 316 (citing 3A J. WIGmonr, EVIDMCE § 940 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)).
7 1 E.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
7 2 E.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U.S. 1 (1966).
73 Berger, supra note 5, at 57; Ordover, supra note 5, at 126; Washburn, supra
note 22, at 301; Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict With the Confrontation
Clause?, 9 IrN,. L. REv. 418, 421 (1976); Note, Indicia of Consent? A Proposal for
Change to the Common Law Rule Admitting Evidence of a Rape Victim's Character
for Chastity, 7 Loy. Cm. L.J. 118, 131 (1976); Note, Relevancy of Evidence of
Prior Sexual Conduct Under the Kentucky Revised Statute Section 510.145, 4 N. Ky.
L. RFEv. 345, 371 (1977); 8 GA. L. REv. 973, 980 (1974); 52 WASH. L. REv. 1011,
1034 (1977). See People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864
(1976) (testing California's rape shield law against the defendant's right to a fair
trial); WASH. Rlv. CoDE ANN. § 9.79.150 (1978) (sexual history evidence allowed
if its exclusion "would result in a denial of substantial justice to the defendant").
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this standard.7- The Court has conceded that "show-ups" are in-
herently suggestive; yet they do not per se violate the defendant's
right to a fair trial.75 Instead, this type of procedure is recognized
as important to the state in quickly assuring the accuracy of an
arrest. For the procedure to violate the Constitution, it must have
been unnecessarily suggestive, and it must have created a substan-
tial likelihood of misidentification. 76 The Court has directed that
the totality of the circumstances be examined in making this de-
termination. Under this line of cases there is no constitutional
violation even with a possibility of misidentification.77 The Con-
stitution will apparently tolerate placing the accused at a disad-
vantage in some situations in order to further the state's important
interest in effective detection and prosecution of crime.
There is some support for the observation that the Court ap-
plies this minimal standard of review in cases under the confronta-
tion and compulsory process clauses. In recent decisions, the
Court has frequently stressed the particular importance of the in-
terests asserted by the defendant and thereby implied that it was
engaging in a balancing test. In Davis v. Alaska,78 state law pro-
hibited cross-examination of a prosecution witness regarding his
juvenile record and probationary status. The Court noted that
"it would be difficult to conceive of a situation more clearly illustrat-
ing the need for cross-examination" 79 and that the credibility of the
witness involved was a "key element" so in the state's case. The
Court concluded that "[s]erious damage to the strength of the
State's case would have been a real possibility had petitioner been
allowed to pursue this line of inquiry. In this setting we conclude
that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of
protecting a juvenile offender." 81 In Washington v. Texas,8 2 de-
cided under the compulsory process clause, language again appears
74 See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188 (1972); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967).
7 5 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
76 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
7 7 "What is less clear from our cases is whether... unnecessary suggestiveness
alone requires the exclusion of evidence . . . . Weighing all the factors, we find
no substantial likelihood of misidentification." Id. 201 (emphasis added).




82388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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that stresses the particular importance to the defendant of the ex-
cluded evidence. The testimony was described as "vital" 83 to his
defense and the rule under which it was excluded referred to as
"arbitrary." 84
Notwithstanding such language, analysis of the facts of these
cases suggests that the Court was not applying this minimal standard
of review. Despite some indication to the contrary in the opinion,
the excluded testimony in Davis was not very important. An in-
quiry into a major prosecution witness's juvenile status is tradi-
tionally relevant: a witness arguably might try to help the police
by fabricating testimony because he feared that his juvenile proba-
tionary status was in jeopardy.s5 Although this examination of
possible interest is relevant, it is hardly of so compelling a nature
that a manifestly unfair trial would result from its exclusion.86 The
infringement of the defendant's constitutional rights in Davis was
thus of a different degree altogether from the other situations that
have been found to violate this minimal standard, such as the sup-
pression of exculpatory evidence 87 or the use of perjured testimony
against a defendant. 8 The comparative unimportance of the in-
fringement suffered by the defendant in Davis indicates that the




84 Id. 23. Washington is complicated by the fact that it is the case that holds
that compulsory process is obligatory upon the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. The opinion is therefore full of due process references.
85 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
86 Id. 312. Other testimony that suggested that the witness might be lying to
avoid trouble with the police did come into evidence. Defense counsel elicited
testimony that the stolen safe was found on the witness's property and that the
thought had crossed the witness's mind that the police might suspect him. Id.
312-13. See Lagenour v. State, 376 N.E.2d 475, 478 (Ind. 1978) (the state's
interest in Davis was "extraneous"). But see Finney v. State, 385 N.E.2d 477
(Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (impeachment may be curtailed if other, independent lines
of impeachment had been pursued, regardless of relevance of the excluded testi-
mony). The result in Finney cannot be squared with the contrary holding in
Davis.
8713rady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of a coparticipant's
statement that he, not the defendant, did the actual killing).
s8 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutor obtained testimony from
the chief witness that he had not received a promise of leniency in return for testi-
mony, when the prosecutor knew that he had); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28
(1957) (prosecutor elicited testimony that he knew was false and that, if believed,
would have reduced the degree of homicide).
89 The other indication that a strict standard of review is appropriate is that
confrontation and compulsory process are rights specifically contained in the sixth
amendment. In reviewing other specific guarantees of that amendment, the Court
has employed a strict standard-once the Court has defined the extent of such a
right, it has allowed no leeway for argument that the right should not be provided
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Whether applying this strict standard overtly or in the guise of
a balancing test, the Court must first decide if a case implicates a
particular right or prohibition contained in the Constitution. At
this stage, the Court engages in a process akin to a balancing test.
As a defendant seeks to avoid more than the basic evil the amend-
ment was designed to eliminate, the Court will consider the com-
peting interests of the state.90 When the state demonstrates a com-
pelling interest, the scope of the defendant's right will be more
limited than in those situations in which the state has no real inter-
est.91 Likewise, as the right's importance to the defendant increases,
it becomes harder for the state to justify the limitation on its ex-
ercise.92 With this procedure for choosing among protected inter-
in a specific case. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
See also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). Similarly, once the Court
decided that the fifth amendment required certain warnings to defendants, Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), convictions were overturned in the absence of
such warnings, regardless of the seriousness of the crime or the defendant's aware-
ness of his rights. See, e.g., State v. Stein, 70 N.J. 369, 360 A.2d 347 (1976)
(that defendant was himself a lawyer did not mean he had a lesser right to counsel).
See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
The minimal standard of review has been applied, on the other hand, to pro-
cedural rights that must be read into the due process clause. Constitutional viola-
tions are found only after application of a "totality of the circumstances" test. See,
e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969) (Identification procedure "so
undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due
process."); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[Sluppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.").
90 "[C]onstitutional line drawing becomes more difficult as the reach of the
Constitution is extended further, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from
one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to another." Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 372 (1979).
91 See Westen, supra note 50, at 580-81. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979) (cost and confusion in district courts of giving right to counsel in
cases in which no imprisonment occurs outweighs interest of defendant); Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (exigent circumstances permit warrantless searches
of automobiles); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (necessities of police work
permit limited stops and frisks on less than probable cause).
But ef. Rudstein, supra note 14, at 18 ("[A] state . . . cannot exclude trust-
worthy evidence critical to the defense . . . unless the defendant's interest is out-
weighed by a legitimate competing state interest .... " (emphasis added)); Note,
Indianas Rape Shield Law: Conflict With the Confrontation Clause?, 9 IND. L.
REv. 418, 423 (1976) (also refers to "legitimate" state interest as the appropriate
test).
92See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (Respondent had properly
,conceded that "'a denial of cross-examination . . . would be constitutional error of
-the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure
it.'"); Westen, supra note 53, at 161 ("No interest protected by a privilege is
sufficiently important to outweigh the defendant's right to establish his innocence
through the presentation of clearly exculpatory evidence." (emphasis added)). See
also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (right to counsel at sentencing hear-
ing); Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (warrant issued by magistrate paid
according to number of warrants he issued was void); Geders v. United States,
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ests, the Court has carved out exceptions to the warrant requirement
in the face of exigent circumstances. 93 Similarly, in limiting the
right to counsel to cases in which imprisonment results, the Court
has balanced the costs and confusion imposed on the states against
the burden imposed on the defendant.94
Once the process of constitutional line drawing is completed,
a decision that a particular practice is central to an interest protected
by an amendment will be strictly enforced.95 This analysis more
easily explains the result in Davis. The Court decided that a de-
fendant has a general right under the confrontation clause to expose
the bias and interest of prosecution witnesses.96 The state thus may
not constitutionally impede that effort, even in a case in which the
needs of the particular defendant may be slight and the interest
of the state important.9
In one remaining situation, the strict standard of review may
not be employed-when there are competing constitutional rights.
For example, a defendant is specifically guaranteed an impartial
jury and the general due process right to a fair trial; 98 when these
rights conflict with freedom of the press, however, the dispute must
be resolved by a balancing of rights. In such a case the defendant
425 U.S. 80 (1976) (right to counsel prevented court from prohibiting defendant
from consulting with attorney on night between defendant's direct and cross-
examination, despite fear of improper coaching); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970) (right to counsel at preliminary hearing at which failure to assert a defense
might bar its use at trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Under
Miranda and subsequent cases, confessions may not be offered against a defendant
who elects to remain silent at trial unless specific warnings were given and waived,
regardless of any showing of special circumstances by the state. This line of cases,
however, is now perceived by many to be under attack. See North Carolina v.
Butler, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979).
93 E.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (inventory searches);
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border searches); Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (search of vehicles); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit).
94 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972).
95 See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
96"Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a
witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.... A more particular attack on
the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward
revealing possible biases, prejudices or ulterior motives of the witness .... Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
97 The Court noted that the state had an "important" interest; yet that interest
was easily outweighed by the right of "effective cross-examination." Id. 319, 318.
See note 86 supra & accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Estelle v. Williams,
425 U.S. 501 (1976); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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does not automatically prevail. 9 Important government interests
may justify shielding rape victims from harassment by defense at-
torneys,lw but no constitutional right protects the victim. The
closest thing to a constitutional right that can be asserted is the
right of privacy. This penumbral protection, though recognized
in other contexts, has a very limited application. It only defines a
zone of personal autonomy that must be left free from governmental
intrusion.01 Even most advocates of rape victim shield laws con-
cede that the rights of privacy may not be applied to shield a woman
who wishes to testify against an accused rapist from embarrassment
that might be caused by inquiry into her prior sexual activities.
102
The interests of the victim, not rising to the level of constitutional
concerns, thus do not militate against applying a strict standard to
rape victim shield laws that limit defendants' sixth amendment
rights.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF REvIEW TO
RAPE VIcTIm SHIELD LAws
We turn now to the application of the strict standard of review
to rape victim shield laws. If the sixth amendment rights of con-
frontation and compulsory process properly include the right to
present evidence of the complainant's sexual history, then many of
the statutes that limit the accused's ability to do so are unconstitu-
tional. The assumption underlying the following discussion is that
the sixth amendment guarantees that a defendant will be allowed
to introduce all probative evidence unless it has an outweighing
prejudicial effect. Within the concept of admissibility is a balancing
between probative value and prejudicial effect, and it is in this area
99 E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Times-Picayune
Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1974).
The Court has had similar problems when a witness asserts a testimonial privi-
lege based upon the fifth amendment, and the privilege prevents the defendant
from cross-examining. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931);
Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict With the Confrontation Clause?, 9 Ism.
L. REv. 418, 420 (1976). Cf. In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (newsman's shield law, legitimately based upon first
amendment rights, fell to the defendant's need for compulsory process, following
the court's application of the balancing test of Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
.(1972)).
10 0 See notes 105-06 infra & accompanying text.
101 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). See Henkin, Privacy
and Autonomy, 74 COLTm. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
102 See Berger, supra note 5, at 40 ("the prospects of such a right being
recognized are realistically very dim").
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that the constitutional line drawing must occur. The first issue is
whether the state has a special interest in rape cases, sufficiently
greater than that in other criminal cases, to justify heavier restric-
tions on sixth amendment rights. If not, the next question is
whether the right to introduce relevant evidence includes the pres-
entation of sexual history evidence. We will thus attempt to
balance the probative value of such testimony against its prejudicial
effect. If the prejudicial effect is substantial or the probative value
unusually insignificant, then evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual
activities may be declared inadmissible and the accused prevented
from introducing it.
A. The State Interests in Rape Cases
Assuming for the moment that evidence of the victim's prior
sexual activities is relevant in rape prosecutions, 10 3 a state could
justify a shield statute only if its interests were sufficiently com-
pelling 104 and the probative value of the evidence slight. Redraw-
ing the constitutional line could conceivably be justified under such
circumstances. Our purpose here is only to ascertain whether there
is any possible reason to redefine the general sixth amendment
standard from one that guarantees defendants the right to intro-
duce relevant evidence to one that excludes otherwise relevant evi-
dence in rape cases. Because we answer that question in the nega-
tive, it is unnecessary to rebalance the probative value of sexual
history evidence against the interests the state is asserting in order
to define a new constitutional standard.
Proponents of rape victim shield laws most often cite as the
interests to be protected sheltering the victim from humiliation and
psychological damage, and encouraging the reporting and prosecu-
10 3 The probative value of sexual history evidence will be discussed at text
accompanying notes 116-63 infra, its possible prejudicial effect at text accompanying
notes 164-220 infra.
104A reading of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), and Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), indicates that rational and important state interests are
not enough. "Thus, Davis appears to stand for the proposition that the defendant's
right of cross-examination-like his right to be present at trial--can be overcome,
if at all, only for compelling reasons." Westen, supra note 50, at 580-81 (emphasis
added); see Westen, supra note 53, at 115-16. Cf. People v. Khan, 80 Mich. App.
605, 264 N.W.2d 360 (1978) (eschewing a balancing of interests test absent
demonstrably relevant sexual history evidence); Note, Relevancy of Evidence of
Prior Sexual Conduct Under the Kentucky Revised Statute Section 510.145, 4 N. Ky.
L. REv. 345, 364 (1977) (advocating a balancing between protection of the victim
and protection of the accused). But see Rudstein, supra note 14, at 18 (reading
Davis, together with Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), as allowing
legitimate state interest to outweigh the defendant's needs).
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tion of rape."°" Both are legitimate and worthwhile interests for the
state to pursue, and unquestionably both are furthered by shield
laws.106 In order to begin to argue that the constitutional standard
should be changed for rape cases, however, a special and particularly
compelling reason must be shown.
The Supreme Court has considered restricting the defendant's
right to introduce relevant evidence in a situation in which the
state's interests are at least as great and has declined to vary the
general standard. In cases concerning disclosure of the identity of a
police informer,107 the Court has clearly stated that the defendant's
right to introduce relevant evidence, whatever its probative value,
prevents the state from withholding the identity of an informer.
The state's interest in protecting witnesses is greater in informer
cases than in rape cases because identifying an informer creates a
possibility of physical harm, not merely humiliation.108 The state's
interest in the effective prosecution of crime is great as well because
informers and undercover agents are frequently the only way of
gathering evidence of organized crime. 19 In rape cases the num-
ber of prosecutions may well be fewer because some victims do not
report rapes out of, among other things, fear of the court pro-
cess, 110 but it seems unlikely that the state interest in effective crime
control is more substantially harmed in rape cases than in informer
situations.
Despite the state's great interest in protecting informers, even
that practice has been limited. The Court in Smith v. Illinois "
held that the right of confrontation had been denied when the de-
10 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 146 Ca. App. 277, 280, 246 S.E.2d 363, 365
(1978); Washburn, supra note 22, at 281; Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict
With the Confrontation Clause?, 9 INn. L. REv. 418, 435 (1976).
106 See Roberts v. State, 373 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. 1978) (shield law is a
"rational" attempt to protect the victim); People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705,
257 N.W.2d 268 (1977) (state's interest is "legitimate"); State v. Herrera, 92 N.M.
7, 582 P.2d 384 (1978) (statute is "reasonable"). But see Rudstein, supra note
14, at 27 ("a rape shield law . . . may only marginally achieve [the] goal [of
encouraging the reporting of rapes]"). Cf. Note, California Rape Evidence Reform:
An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HAsNGs L.J. 1551, 1554 (1976) (extent to
which laws will increase reporting depends on how often defense is able to evade
restrictions imposed).
107See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300 (1967); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
308 See Comment, The Informer Privilege: What's in a Name?, 64 J. Ctm.
L.C. & P.S. 56, 61 (1973); Note, Extent of the Government's Informer Privilege
in Federal and Florida Criminal Cases, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 218, 219 (1968).
109 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 66 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting).
1 10 
LAw ENFORCEMENT AssisTANcE ADMJNISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE,
CnRms ANm VicTns 12 (1974): "More so than for any other crime, there are
strong pressures on the victim not to report the incident .... "See note 13 supra.
ll390 U.S. 129 (1968).
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fendant was prevented from ascertaining the name and address of
an informer. The result in Smith cannot be explained on the
ground that the name and address of the witness were particularly
important in that case. The informer had admitted on cross-
examination that he was using a fictitious name, and the jury was
therefore aware of it. In addition, the defense attorney had formerly
represented the informer and thus knew that the name given the
court was false. There was no suggestion that any actual prejudice
was involved or that the defense had been less than effective because
of the absence on the record of the true name and address of the
witness."1
2
In a related case, Roviaro v. United States,"3 the Court reached
a similar result when the failure to disclose the identity of an in-
former who did not testify possibly prevented the defendant from
calling that witness in his own defense. The case was decided pur-
suant to the Court's supervisory powers and does not rest on the
sixth amendment." 4  Nonetheless, the Court's reasoning was the
same. It conceded that preservation of the anonymity of informants
encouraged the reporting and prosecution of crimes, but decided
that the ability of the accused to defend himself had to take preced-
ence. The Court noted that the informer was a witness to the
alleged crime. His testimony was, therefore, possibly relevant; it
might have established an entrapment defense or cast doubt on the
state's case." 5 The mere possibility was enough to outweigh the
interests of the government. In light of these informant cases-
involving a greater state interest in witness protection, at least as
substantial an interest in effective prosecution, and often very little
probative value-it is not likely a rape victim will be afforded greater
personal protection at the expense of the defendant's right to present
relevant evidence.
B. Prejudicial Impact of Sexual History Evidence
The determination of relevance is a two-step process. The
evidence must have a logical tendency to make a material fact more
112 Because both the jury and the defense knew that the name used by the
informant was false, the case turned on the single fact that the name had not been
given on cross-examination. For this reason, Justice Harlan, in his dissent, thought
it a harmless error case. Id. 134 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
"14McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312 (1967) (Roviaro based on Court's
power to formulate evidence rules for federal criminal trials). But see Westen,
supra note 58, at 210 (Roviaro implicitly decided on sixth amendment grounds).
The basis for the decision was not made clear in the opinion.
115 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 64 (1957).
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or less likely, and this probative value must not be outweighed by
the evidence's prejudicial effect.116 We will examine whether sexual
history evidence has any probative value in the concluding section
of this Article. Our purpose now is to determine whether this
testimony has a prejudicial effect that justifies its exclusion.117
Traditional evidence law recognizes that otherwise relevant
evidence may be inadmissible because it would have the effect of
disrupting the trial or sidetracking the search for truth. This
"prejudicial" effect of testimony has been defined by McCormick to
encompass four reasons for excluding otherwise probative evidence:
First, the danger that the facts offered may unduly arouse
the jury's emotions of prejudice, hostility or sympathy.
Second, the probability that the proof and the answering
evidence that it provokes may create a side issue that will
unduly distract the jury from the main issues. Third, the
likelihood that the evidence offered and the counter proof
will consume an undue amount of time. Fourth, the
danger of unfair surprise to the opponent when, having no
reasonable ground to anticipate this development of the
proof, he would be unprepared to meet it.118
If evidence of the sexual history of a rape victim always falls within
one of these four categories, a blanket shield law would be con-
stitutionally unobjectionable.
The ground most frequently put forth in support of a blanket
rule excluding sexual history evidence is the first, that such evi-
dence is "prejudicial" and that this effect outweighs its slight
probative value."19 The issue is not whether evidence is prejudicial
in the sense that it is detrimental to someone involved in the
116Professor Westen argues that the defendant has a right to present any
evidence with probative value and that the exceptions based upon prejudicial effect
raise serious constitutional problems. Westen, supra note 58, at 207-13. Westen's
argument is that, under Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), courts cannot
exclude potentially relevant evidence if less drastic alternatives such as cautionary
instructions are available. Westen, supra note 58, at 212-13. Because the Court
in Washington indicated that traditional rules of privilege do not violate the guar-
antee of compulsory process, traditional exceptions for prejudicial effect will not
likely offend that provision either.
117To say that sexual history evidence is irrelevant is to beg the question.
The analysis must instead be whether such evidence is relevant in some instances,
whether shield laws prevent a defendant from introducing such evidence, and
whether that exclusion is constitutional. The authors follow this format and there-
fore phrase the issue in the latter way, which assumes that evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct will at times be relevant.
118 McCoNMcrc, supra note 16, at § 185, at 439-40 (footnotes omitted).
119 See, e.g., People v. McKenna, 585 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1978).
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trial.12 0  Rather, the question is whether the evidence will arouse
the jury's emotions of prejudice, hostility, or sympathy. 12 1  Argu-
ments that sexual history evidence is inadmissible because of its
prejudicial impact on the rape victim 122 miss the point. Adverse
psychological effects suffered by crime victims, although regrettable,
are not grounds for excluding probative evidence. Professor Berger
concedes as much by adding to her model statute a fifth ground,
"unwarranted invasion of the complainant's privacy," to the usual
four reasons for excluding sexual history evidence. 123
In one sense, proponents of rape shield law themselves concede
that no absolute rule can apply. All such laws carry some excep-
tions-certain instances in which the legislators thought sexual his-
tory more probative than prejudicial. In fact, almost every con-
ceivable use of sexual history evidence is excepted and admissible
under at least one rape victim shield law.124  In contrast, for other
areas of evidence the common law has determined that the pos-
sibility of prejudice always outweighs probative value. Settlement
120 As McCormick points out, "[a] party's case is always damaged by evidence
that the facts are contrary to his contentions; but that cannot be ground for
exclusion." McCopamu, supra note 16, at § 185, at 439 n.31.
121 McCoRNIcE, supra note 16, at § 185, at 439. See FED. R. Evn. 403.
122 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 5, at 71-72; Note, California Evidence Rape
Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HAsTiNcs L. REv. 1551, 1565 (1975);
8 GA. L. REv. 973, 980 (1974); 52 WASH. L. REv. 1011, 1027-28 (1977). Some
of this confusion may stem from reading Wigmore too literally when he says that,
as a general theory, evidence may be excluded if it "tends . . . to produce ...
an unfair prejudice to the opponent." 6 J. WIGMOHE, EVIDENCE § 1864, at 643
(Chadbourn rev. 1976). See note 154 infra & accompanying text.
123 Berger, supra note 5, at 97-99. This provision can also be found in ALAsna.
STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. Ar. § 2A:84A-32.1 (West Supp.
1979-1980). See also MAss. Ar. LAws ch. 233, § 21B (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp.
1978) (relevance must outweigh prejudice to the victim).
124 See Appendix, infra. Statutes have specifically provided for the admissi-
bility of sexual history evidence relevant to the complainant's credibility, e.g., CAL.
Evm. CODE § 782 (West Supp. 1979); alternative sources of semen, injury, preg-
nancy, or disease, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 412(b)(2) (a); evidence "directly pertaining
to the act upon which the prosecution is based," e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1810.2
(1977); prior sexual relations with the accused, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-32.5-2
(Burns Supp. 1978) (amended 1979); subsequent sexual relations with the accused,
e.g., COLO. BEV. STAT. § 18-3-407(1) (a) (1978); similar patterns of sexual conduct
with persons other than the defendant if relevant to consent, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.022(2) (West 1976); an ulterior motive in accusing the defendant, e.g., MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A(a)(3) (Supp. 1978); the bias of the complainant, e.g.,
On. rEv. STAT. § 163A75(5) (a) (1977); the complainant's record as a prostitute,
e.g., N.Y. Cam. Puoc. LAw § 60.42(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); sexual be-
havior offered as the basis of expert psychological testimony that the complainant
fantasized the act, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(b) (4) (Supp. 1977) (amended
1979); and a history of false rape charges, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3 25 5 (a)
(3)(C) (Supp. 1979).
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offers,125 subsequent repairs,'12 and the existence of liability insur-
ance '2 7 are all inadmissible on the issue of liability. They may be
admitted only for other purposes-repairs may be offered, for ex-
ample, as proof of ownership, 28 and a witness's connection to the
insurer may be offered to show testimonial bias. 29
In the case of a rape victim's sexual history, exceptions to the
rule may relate to the essential question of the accused's criminal
liability. The statutes and commentators alike recognize that a
pattern of consensual sexual activity between the victim and the ac-
cused is relevant to establish consent, a fundamental issue in de-
termining guilt. 30 There is, on the other hand, serious disagree-
ment whether infrequent prior consensual sex with the defendant,
or regular prior sexual relations with persons other than the defend-
ant, should be admissible on exactly the same issue-consent. The
statutes themselves engage in balancing between probative value
and prejudicial impact. In effect, they are the products of the
traditional process of determining admissibility, performed by the
legislature rather than the judge.' 3 Legislatures are not, however,
in nearly as good a position to make such decisions. The trial
judge can view the unique circumstances in each case and apply
the test with the benefit of full knowledge of the context in which
evidence is offered. He can make the fine decisions about admitting
similar evidence in similar trials based on the individual witnesses
and juries and the nuances of the factual development. A legisla-
ture cannot conceivably envision all circumstances that may arise,
and its determination of relevance will thus undoubtedly be flawed
in some unforeseen situations 3 2
A number of commentators argue that any evidence of prior
sexual activity creates a substantial prejudicial effect-a likelihood
125 FED. R. Evm. 408; McComncx, supra note 16, at § 274.
126 Columbia & P.S.R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892); FED. B. Evrn.
407; McCoRMIC., supra note 16, at § 275.
127 FED. R. Evm. 411; McCoRwacy, supra note 16, at § 201.
128 McCoRaZcK, supra note 16, at § 275, at 667-78 & nn.20-25 and cases cited
therein.
129 Id. § 201, at 480 n.10.
:30 Even jurisdictions with exclusionary rape victim shield laws usually allow
testimony about sexual relations between the victim and the accused. See Appendix,
infra.
'31 "This balancing of intangibles-probative values against probative dangers
-is so much a matter where wise judges in particular situations may differ that a
leeway of discretion is generally recognized." McCoUsCKc, supra note 16, at § 185,
at 440.
132 For a very unusual factual allegation, see People v. Mandel, 61 App. Div.
2d 563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978).
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that a jury exposed to such evidence will try the character of the
victim rather than the guilt of the accused.13 Only a very high pro-
bative value could outweigh this effect. The supposed danger of a
jury decision based on the character of the victim rather than the
case against the defendant is equally applicable to any trial in which
the guilt of the accused depends primarily on the testimony of the
victim. Juries in every case must decide whether to believe the
witnesses who testify against a defendant. They are routinely in-
structed to consider such factors as demeanor and attitude in de-
ciding whether to give credence to testimony. 3 4
The available statistics do not support the argument that it is
sexual history evidence that results in acquittals. According to the
F.B.I. uniform crime statistics, the acquittal rate has been fairly
constant before and after the advent of rape victim shield laws. 35
The only major social science study of the trial process was made
in the 1950s by Kalven and Zeisel.136 Although inconclusive on this
point, it has been cited (out of context) in many articles as docu-
menting "manifestly unfair jury verdicts resulting from unduly
influential evidence of the victim's sexual history." 137 Most often
133 E.g., Berger, supra note 5, at 30-31; 8 GA. L. REv. 973, 981 (1974). Cf.
Note, People v. Rincon-Pineda: Rape Trials Depart the Seventeenth Century-
Farewell to Lord Hale, 11 TuLSA L.J. 279, 283 (1975) (unlikely that defendant
will be unfairly convicted by jury).
134 See, e.g., CoMaMrrr ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMNAL, OF rH
SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGEL.s CoUNTY, CALFoRNIA, CALnioRNTA JuRY INsTRuc-
TIONS: CRmNAL No. 2.20 (3d ed. 1970); 1 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKmA_, FEDERAL
JuRY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTiONS § 12.01 (2d ed. 1970).
135 According to the FEDERAL BUREAu OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFoRM CRIME
REPORTS, the percentage of acquittals and/or dismissals in rape cases has been as
follows:
1965: 43% 1972: 49%
1966: 42% 1973: 47%
1967: 44% 1974: 49%
1968: 44% 1975: 46%
1969: 49% 1976: 49%
1970: 46% 1977: 40%
1971: 48% 1978: no rate reported
The figures indicate a slight rise in acquittal rate as rape victim shield laws became
effective, followed by a slight drop in 1977. Although it is tempting to associate
the drop in acquittal rate with the rise of rape shield laws, there is no justification
for doing so. First, the number of rape cases affected by shield laws may be quite
small. See note 146 infra & accompanying text. Second, the acquittal rate in 1976
was as high as it has ever been, despite shield laws in effect in 24 states and
another seven put into effect for part of that year. The states that had shield laws,
which included California, New York, and Texas, account for approximately two-
thirds of all reported rapes. FEDERAL BuPmAu OF INVESTIATION, UNIFoRm CiM
REPoRTs (1976).
136 H. KAiWN & H. ZEisEL, ThE AMERCAN JuRy (1966).
137 52 WASH. L. REv. 1011, 1017 (1977). See Berger, supra note 5, at 30;
Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 Am. CRiM. L. iV.
309, 341 (1973); Note, The Admissibility of a Rape-Complainant's Previous Sexual
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mentioned is the now famous table showing that in thirty-seven of
forty-two rape cases examined, the jury acquitted the defendant of
the rape charge.188 Even making the assumption others have made
-that because this study took place in the 1950s when evidence of
sexual history was admissible, it was actually introduced-the sta-
tistics do not support the contention that there is a legally cognizable
prejudicial effect. If anything, the study refutes it. Only the results
in a particular category of nonaggravated rape trials are reported
in the table. The table indicates only that in cases in which de-
fendants were charged with forcible rape and the evidence showed
no injury to the victim and the accused and the victim knew each
other, juries tended to acquit or find the defendant guilty of a lesser
charge.139 Excluded from the table are all rape cases in which the
victim was injured, in which the victim was raped by more than one
person, and in which the victim was raped by a man she did not
know.140 When all rape cases are considered together, rape falls
within the statistical profile for all crimes. The basic verdict pat-
tern shows that juries acquitted in thirty-three percent of all cases
and that they were more lenient than the presiding judge would
have been in twenty percent of all cases.' 4 ' Juries acquitted in forty-
three percent of forcible rape trials, more often than in trials for
other crimes, but they were more lenient than judges only eighteen
percent of the time. 42 In cases of aggravated rape, juries acquitted
Conduct: The Need for Legislative Reform, 11 NEw ENG. L. Ruv. 497, 502 (1976);
Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible
Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 127, 157 (1975); Note, Criminal Law Reform in
Vermont: The Proposal to Exclude Evidence of the Victim's Character in Forcible
Rape Cases, 1 VT. L. REv. 215, 218-20 (1976). Cf. Note, People v. Rincon-Pineda:
Rape Trials Depart the Seventeenth Century-Farewell to Lord Hale, 11 TUTrSA
L.J. 279, 283 (1975) (study cited for proposition that juries are lenient in rape
trials when they find "contributory behavior" on the part of the victim). Contra,
Rudstein, supra note 14, at 27-29. See also Note, California Rape Evidence Reform:
An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1551, 1572 (1975).
138 H. KAIVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 136, at 254 (Table 73).
139 Id. 254. "Acquittal here means acquittal from the major charge of rape,
even if convicted of a lesser charge."
140 Id. 252.
'41 Id. 68 (Table 18).
142 Id. 70 (Table 19). The leniency figure represents those cases in which
the jury acquitted and the judge thought the evidence strong enough for conviction.
Juries were more lenient than they were in rape cases in cases involving murder,
manslaughter, negligent homicide, aggravated assault, statutory rape, molestation of
a minor, indecent exposure, drunken driving, burglary, petit larceny, receiving stolen
goods, fraud, gambling, violation of game law, and some liquor offenses. Id. 69-75
(Table 19). In statutory rape cases, however, the study found a leniency rate of
32%, higher than that for all crimes except indecent exposure and gambling. Id.
In another study of 21 rape trials involving 22 defendants, the jury acquitted
eight (36%) of the defendants. Weninger, Factors Affecting the Prosecution of
Rape: A Case Study of Travis County, Texas, 64 VA. L. REv. 357, 360-61 (1978).
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only twenty-five percent of the time, significantly less than in cases
of other crimes.
143
There is a severe problem with trying to make any use of the
Kalven and Zeisel study for our purposes. The authors do not in-
dicate what percentage of the cases studied, if any, involved testi-
mony about the victim's prior sexual history. In another study,
Professor Weninger examined the prosecution of rape cases in
Travis County, Texas, from 1970 to 1976.14 During that time,
prior sexual history evidence was admissible in that state. 45 None-
theless, the study reports: "In no case did the defense present evi-
dence of specific acts of intercourse with persons other than the
accused or of a reputation for unchastity, and in only one trial was
there testimony concerning prior sexual activity with the defend-
ant." 146 Without knowing whether prior sexual history evidence
was even used in any of the trials studied by Kalven and Zeisel, it
is impossible to establish any connection between such testimony
and the acquittal rate.
Despite the absence of conclusive evidence, one may neverthe-
less intuitively sense a danger that juries will decide cases on the
basis of victims' sexual pasts and will ignore other evidence. This
fear is certainly no greater, however, than the fear that a jury, upon
hearing that a defendant has a long criminal record, will convict
him because he is a "criminal," even though evidence in the case on
trial might be weak.147 Although certain types of previous crimes
But cf. Note, People v. Rincon-Pineda: Rape Trials Depart the Seventeenth Century
-Farewell to Lord Hale, 11 TULSA L.J. 279, 283 (1975) (of the four violent crimes,
rape has the highest rate of acquittals or dismissals).
143 In 64 aggravated rape cases-that is, cases involving evidence of violence,
several assailants, or an accused and victim who were strangers-the jury acquitted
only 16 times. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 136, at 252-53. Juries acquitted
a higher percentage of defendants charged with manslaughter, negligent homicide,
aggravated assault, simple assault, weapons offenses, statutory rape, incest, molesta-
tion of a minor, indecent exposure, commercial vice, other sex offenses, drunken
driving, traffic offenses, public disorder, malicious mischief, non-support, burglary,
auto theft, mail theft, grand larceny, petit larceny, receiving stolen goods, embezzle-
ment, fraud, arson, gambling, game law violations, liquor offenses, regulatory
offenses, perjury, escape, and bribery. Id. 69-75 (Table 19).
144 Weninger, supra note 142, at 358.
145 Texas passed a weak rape victim shield law which took effect on September
1, 1975, and would thus have affected only the final year of the six-year study.
All that T.x. PE,,AL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979) does,
however, is provide for an in camera relevancy hearing. The statute does not
prohibit sexual history evidence.
14 6 Weninger, supra note 142, at 363-64. Of the 22 rape trials examined by
the study, seven involved the issue of consent.
147 [T]here is an obvious danger that the jury, despite instructions, will
give more heed to the past convictions as evidence that the accused is the
kind of man who would commit the crime on charge, or even that he ought
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may not be introduced, and a prior record is admissible only for very
limited purposes, such evidence is universally admitted against a
testifying defendant despite the possibility of prejudice.1 48 To argue
that a rape victim is entitled to greater protection against prejudi-
cial testimony than is the accused is ludicrous. Rape victim shield
laws cannot be justified, therefore, on the ground that the prejudi-
cial effect of sexual history evidence outweighs its probative value
in every case.
A line of inquiry that has probative value may be excluded,
secondly, upon proof that raising the issue will unduly distract the
jury. This limitation is not merely a repetition of the first rule
concerning prejudicial effect, the possibility that sexual history evi-
dence may cause the jury to find guilt based on the moral character
of the complainant and their feelings about premarital sex. Rather,
evidence is excluded on this ground because of both the remoteness
of the issue sought to be raised and the likelihood that the testimony
will be accorded undue weight by a jury. According to Wigmore,
this limitation is given effect only when the evidence is minor and
cumulative and is not the sole mode of proof for the matter at
issue.149 Once a rape complainant admits the facts of her sexual
history, the rule could operate to prevent the defendant from calling
a number of witnesses in his case in chief to testify to the same facts.
This limitation cannot be applied, however, to exclude all evidence
probative of a material issue.
The rules of evidence give a judge discretion to exclude other-
wise probative evidence thirdly when the proof and counterproof
will consume an undue amount of time.150 A statute absolutely bar-
ring the use of sexual history evidence cannot be justified on this
ground. Gross-examining a rape complainant will not create undue
delay in every instance. Discretion is recognized in the rule itself,
which allows exclusion of probative evidence only when it will cause
an "undue" delay. Mere length of time is not sufficient. Time be-
to be put away without too much concern with present guilt, than they
will to the legitimate bearing of the past convictions on credibility.
McCormick, supra note 16, at § 43, at 89 (footnote omitted). See F. BA.Ey &
H. Ro-mnATTr, SoccEssFuJ TEcm-UEs FoR nnRnmA~L TIA.Ls § 244 (1971).
148 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 609, limiting admissible evidence to crimes punish-
able by death or imprisonment for more than one year and crimes involving dis-
honesty that were committed within ten years. See generally McCowvcK, supra
note 16, at § 43. Contra, UNIwoRm RULE OF EvIDEN E 21. See generally McGowan,
Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 LAw & Soc.
ORDER 1.
1496 J. WIOMORE, EviDEN CE § 1864, 1865, 1908 (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
150 McCoMiucx, supra note 16, at § 185, at 439-40; 6 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1904 (Chadboum rev. 1976).
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comes important only when it affords an opportunity for confusion
of the issues-when the overall effect of the additional proof obscures
rather than clarifies the search for truth. Thus, the rule is directed
at preventing needless cumulative evidence and multiple witnesses
on relatively unprofitable lines of testimony, not at excluding an
issue altogether.15 1
A fourth possible justification for rape victim shield laws is that
otherwise probative evidence may be excluded because of unfair
surprise to the opponent.152  Some proponents of shield laws argue
that the probative value of sexual history evidence must be weighed
against the surprise to the victim, who does not come to court pre-
pared to defend her actions in prior sexual encounters. 53 This
reasoning misconceives the rule of evidence relating to surprise,
which considers only surprise to the opposing party. The victim is
not the opponent, the state is.154 The victim is only a witness.
Still, the victim might not tell the prosecutor, the state's rep-
resentative, about her prior sexual activities, so that he would be
surprised. This argument also fails to justify exclusion of sexual
history evidence for two reasons. First, the law of evidence requires
not only that the state have been surprised, but also that the testi-
151 Each witness adds new items of detail in his examination and cross-
examination; each witness may be impeached by the calling of additional
witnesses on the other side; each of these new ones adds his quota of
details; and each may in turn lead to the calling of new impeaching wit-
nesses on the first side, with each of these last the same round of possi-
bility begins again; until amid the interminable entanglements of scores
of witnesses and their statements it might become practically impossible
for the juryman to follow the thread of the substantial issue in controversy
and to detect the true effect of the evidence. The . . . decision would
probably turn upon the chance effect of fragments of evidence making
casual impressions, rather than upon an orderly consideration of all the
salient facts.
6 J. WicMoRE, EvmE~cE § 1907 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). See id. §§ 1865, 1904.
152 McCouZncE, supra note 16, at § 185, at 440. There is some doubt whether
unfair surprise standing alone may ever be sufficient ground for excluding relevant
evidence. Wigmore was of the opinion that, at common law, surprise was not
sufficient for exclusion, but only justified a rule requiring disclosure in advance of
trial in some cases. 6 J. WioMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1845, 1849 (Chadboum rev.
1976). FED. R. Evm. 403 also does not list surprise as a ground for excluding
relevant evidence. The prevailing view, as noted in the Advisory Committee's note
to rule 403, is that a continuance, not exclusion, is the proper remedy for surprise.
153 See Berger, supra note 5, at 18. Cf. Note, The Rape Victim: A Victim of
Society and the Law, 11 WILAMETrE L.J. 36, 40 (1975) ("[A rape victim] cannot
be expected to be able to disprove charges of specific acts of intercourse made by
men whom the accused has enlisted to testify against her.").
154 The hearsay rules concerning admissions by a party-opponent, e.g., FED. B.
EvD. 801(d)(2), provide that out-of-court statements by the opposing party and
his or her agents are admissible, yet statements by a complaining witness are not.
See, e.g., State v. Dawson, 293 S.C. 167, 26 S.E.2d 506, 507-08 (1943).
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mony have been unforeseeable. 155 It is difficult to argue that attack-
ing the rape victim's testimony by whatever means available or
presenting evidence of consent is not foreseeable, and the prosecutor
cannot very well claim surprise when the defense employs such
tactics. Second, most rape shield laws require a pretrial hearing on
the admissibility of sexual history evidence.15 This procedure
.eliminates any possibility of surprise and is much less restrictive than
:the blanket exclusion of all such testimony on the ground that it
-might, in some cases, be a surprise. Notice to the prosecution has
been used effectively in other areas of criminal law in which sur-
prise is a possibility, such as a defendant's evidence of insanity or
alibi. 5 7
One final consideration is necessary to our discussion of whether
the defendant may be denied the right to introduce probative evi-
dence because of its prejudicial effect. Arguably, a statute that
prohibits such evidence altogether, when less restrictive means are
-available, is unconstitutional. Professor Westen has postulated that
the defendant's rights under the sixth amendment go beyond the
traditional law of relevance, that the defendant has the right to
introduce any probative evidence regardless of its prejudicial
effect. 58 The state may, of course, implement other means to
negate the prejudicial effect. Most rape victim shield laws require
-notice and a pretrial hearing before the defense may elicit sexual
history testimony at trial.'59 These precautions eliminate the pos-
sibility of surprise. Cautionary instructions are available to cure
prejudicial effect and to assure that the jury decides the case on its
merits and not on a moral tangent. Although a jury instruction
may never completely accomplish its intended purpose ' 60 and a
'jury may be unable to consider sexual history evidence only for a
limited purpose, juries are constitutionally presumed able to follow
155 McCoaRcis, supra note 16, at § 185, at 440.
156 Thirty jurisdictions have some provision for pretrial or in camera hearings
on admissibility that must precede introduction of sexual history evidence. Ten
,other jurisdictions require a hearing in certain circumstances. See Appendix, infra.
15 7 E.g., N.C. GEr. STAT. § 15A-959 (1978) (requiring notice and allowing
pretrial hearing if defendant intends to raise an insanity defense); FED. R. CMnM. P.
12.1 (notice of alibi defense). A statute requiring pretrial disclosure of intent to
:raise an alibi defense was upheld in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
158 See note 116 supra.
159 See Appendix, infra.
160 See Berger, supra note 5, at 97. Professor Berger argues that rape victims
should not he singled out even for special curative instructions. Id. 97. See note
147 supra.
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their instructions.161 The entire jury system would be unworkable
if it were based on the assumption that juries could not follow judi-
cial instructions on the law. Only in a few cases has the Supreme
Court thought it necessary to exclude testimony on the basis that a
jury would not be able to follow an instruction to disregard it. All
of those were situations in which important fundamental rights of
the defendant were jeopardized.1 62 If courts allow testimony about
the defendant's prior criminal record and protect him with a cau-
tionary instruction limiting its use, 1 63 then testimony about the
sexual history of a rape victim may be entitled to no greater pro-
tection.
C. Relevance
Our final consideration is whether evidence of a rape victim's
sexual history can ever be relevant. Can it be probative of any
issue material to determining guilt on a rape charge? 164 Intuitively,
the answer seems to be that sometimes it is, but often it is not. The
same may be said for any types of evidence, however; the relevance
of sexual history evidence should therefore be determined, as with
other evidence, by the judge as he sees the issues develop at trial.
Even if such evidence is generally irrelevant, a statute that precludes
a particular inquiry that is relevant in one case has infringed the
rights of the accused to present evidence. In this final section, we
will analyze the relevance of types of sexual history evidence and the
situations in which such evidence has been declared inadmissible by
statute.
1. Reputation and Opinion Testimony
Five state statutes and the Federal Rules of Evidence absolutely
prohibit the use of reputation and opinion testimony and thus
limit sexual history evidence to testimony about specific instances
161 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968); see also Westen, supra
note 58, at 212.
.62 Westen, supra note 58, at 212 & n.68. See Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 128-37 (1968) (disregarding incriminating statements in codefendant's
confession); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 388-89 (1964) (disregarding an
involuntary confession).
163 See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1967) (no error in an instruc-
tion to consider evidence of defendant's prior crimes only for a limited purpose).
See notes 147-48 supra & accompanying text.
164 To be relevant, the evidence need not by itself prove the issue. The test
is whether, taken in conjunction with other evidence, it has a tendency to make a
fact or issue more or less likely. See 1 J. WiMoRE, EVmENcE § 12(2) (1940).
Sexual history evidence that is irrelevant may constitutionally be excluded. See
State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1978); People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App.
705, 257 N.W.2d 268 (1977); note 58 supra & accompanying text.
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of conduct.165 Evidence of a witness's reputation is traditionally
admissible in three situations: (1) as substantive evidence when
reputation is itself at issue, as in libel and slander cases; 166 (2) as
impeachment, to indicate the witness's poor reputation for truth
and veracity; 167 and (3) as a method of proving character. 6, Only
the last of these is of concern here.169 If the character of a witness
is at issue, then "[m]odern common law doctrine makes the neutral
and unexciting reputation evidence the preferred type" of proof.
170
In some states opinion testimony may also be used to prove
character' 71
Proof of a person's character may be offered either when char-
acter is ultimately at issue or as circumstantial evidence of what the
person's actions probably were.172  A persuasive argument can
hardly be made that all rape charges place the victim's chastity or
1
65 
FED. R. Evzo. 412; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (Supp. 1978); MASs.
ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.475 (1977); VT. STAT. ANT.
tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1979).
166 E.g., Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
(inquiry into character by reputation evidence in common law libel case).
1
6 7 See McCoRimcK, supra note 16, at § 44; 3A J. WimoRE, EvmExcE §§ 920-
930 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
168 See McConMucm, supra note 16, at § 186; 5 J. WGMonE, Ev DENcE §§ 1608-
1621 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
' 6 9 As a general matter, it is easy to see why a reputation for chastity is inad-
missible on the issue of credibility--only character for veracity has any logical
bearing on whether one is telling the truth on the witness stand. See McCowMicn,
.supra note 16, at § 44.
170 McCoaMCn, supra note 16, at § 186, at 443 (emphasis added); see State
v. Kirkpatrick, 428 S.W.2d 513, 517 (Mo. 1968); 5 J. WiGMoRE, EVIDENcE § 1610,
at 582 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). See also FED. R. Evm. 405.
In People v. Fink, 59 ITI. App. 3d 51, 374 N.E.2d 1311 (1978), the court
noted that only evidence of the rape complainant's reputation before the incident
was permitted because, once a woman claimed that she had been raped, she could
easily become the subject of rumors that would lead to a false reputation.
171 Opinion testimony has been said to be another way of proving character.
According to Dean Wigmore, the earliest common law rules permitted opinion
testimony about the character of a witness, but the departure from that view has
been almost complete. He cites early English cases that allow opinion testimony.
The rule in this country, however, was always that character could be proved only
by testimony of reputation. Only Ohio seems to have had a line of cases allowing
opinion testimony, see State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907), which
died out in the mid-1900s. Wigmore argues that opinion testimony is more reliable
than evidence of reputation and should be permitted. 7 J. WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1985-1986 (3d ed. 1940). Only in the last few years, with the advent of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, see FED. R. EvD. 405, have some states started admit-
ting opinion testimony of character. See, e.g., ME. R. Evm. 405. Because opinion
testimony was generally not allowed, there is probably no constitutional objection
to continuing that ban.
172 McCoRaWcn, supra note 16, at § 186.
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sexual character directly in issue. 178 The issues in a trial are de-
fined both by the pleadings and by the proof, however, and the-
state may itself bring the victim's sexual character into issue by rais--
ing the matter without objection during the case in chief.17 Yet
jurisdictions that completely bar reputation and opinion testimony
would prevent the defendant from proving a bad reputation for
chastity, even if such testimony was the only rebuttal evidence avail-
able. In all other types of cases, at least reputation testimony is
admissible when character becomes an issue.
A rape victim's sexual character is more likely to be relevant
when offered for the second reason-as circumstantial evidence that
the person acted on a particular occasion in conformity with that
character trait. Generally character evidence is not permitted.175
When proof of a character trait has a logical tendency to make an
issue more or less likely, however, it will be allowed. For example,
a homicide victim's character for violence is admissible on the issue
of self-defense. 7 6 Once a self-defense issue has legitimately been
raised, proof of the deceased's reputation is permitted. The same
rule applies in rape cases when consent is claimed as the defense-
traditionally testimony about the victim's reputation for chastity
has been admissible. It is not the traditional rule to allow evidence
of character for chastity in all cases. In fact, character for chastity
is a misnomer-what is at issue is character for promiscuity or for
indiscriminate consensual sexual activity. In cases legitimately
asserting consent as a defense,'177 the laws of evidence must allow
proof of a pertinent character trait: not mere unchastity, but a
tendency to consent to sex indiscriminately. To prohibit a defend-
ant from offering testimony to prove this trait-by reputation or
opinion evidence-is to deny him the right to present evidence that
would be admissible in a trial for any other criminal offense. The
Advisory Committee's note to rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence states that the rule providing for use of character evidence
1
7 3 But consider statutory rape offenses such as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26
(1969), making it a crime to "carnally know . . . any female child, over twelve
and under sixteen years of age, who has never had sexual intercourse with any
person." Cf. Mo. ANN. STAT. §491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (permitting testi-
mony of specific instances of sexual conduct only when chastity is a statutorily
prescribed element of a rape offense).
174 See notes 191-94 infra & accompanying text.
175 FED. R. Evm. 404(a); McCoMixo, supra note 16, at § 188.
176 FED. R. Evm. 404(a)( 2 ); McCormIcx, supra note 16, at § 193.
-
7 7 Although the state bears the burden of proof on lack of consent, as it does
on absence of self-defense in a homicide case, and although the lack of consent is
an element of most rape laws, it is not necessarily an issue in every rape trial.
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in such situations "is so deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence as to
assume almost constitutional proportion." 178
To illustrate permissible uses of evidence of the victim's char-
acter, consider the following hypothetical. The defendant is an
exterminator who goes on a service call to the home of the com-
plaining witness. The defendant claims that he arrived late in the
afternoon and that the woman consented to-in fact, initiated-
sexual relations. The defendant's version of the events is that
they fell asleep until late evening, at which time the woman
panicked because the company truck was parked in front of the
house in full view of the neighbors. She started screaming at him
to get out, and he later found himself arrested for rape. There is
no evidence of injury or weapons. The complaining witness says
that she consented because the defendant threatened to kill her and
that he stayed until late evening. She was able to call the police
finally after he left. Upon investigation, the defense attorney dis-
covers the complainant's reputation among delivery men for initiat-
ing sexual activity with those who make deliveries to her house. No
one will testify that he personally has had sexual relations with her,
although the attorney is told privately that some have.
The first use of character evidence will be possible if the
complainant testifies on direct examination that she is a "good
Christian woman who does not go around committing adultery."
Or, a neighbor, called by the state to testify that the truck was in
front of the house, testifies that the complainant is "an honest
woman who everybody knows is faithful to her husband." When the
state is thus able to put before the jury a picture of the complainant's
character, the defendant must be allowed to rebut it with evidence
that she is promiscuous. The second use of character evidence
shows a trait that makes the consent defense more likely than not.
Her reputation for indiscriminate consensual sex with deliverymen
certainly makes the defendant's consent defense more likely and
thus meets the test of relevance. An absolute ban on this type of
evidence cannot be reconciled with the defendant's constitutional
right to introduce relevant evidence.
2. Credibility
One state absolutely prohibits use of sexual conduct evidence
to impeach the credibility of the complaining witness. 17 This lim-
178 FED. B. Evin. 404(a) (Advisory Committee's note).
179 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.79.150 (1977). See also Johnson v. State, 146
Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363 (1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West Supp.
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itation conflicts with the common law rules of impeachment and,
more clearly than any other prohibition, cannot be squared with
the accused's right of confrontation. °80 It is one thing to say that
sexual history evidence will no longer be admissible automatically
under the guise of impeaching credibility and quite another to
legislate that it will never be admissible. One need only examine
a few hypotheticals to understand the imprudence of this prohibi-
tion. The simplest involves a complaining witness who falsely
claims during direct examination that she is chaste. The defendant
is entitled to attack her veracity as a witness by exposing false
testimony even if that testimony does not bear directly on a material
issue.' 8 ' Shedding light on a witness's credibility is one of the main
functions of cross-examination-the test of relevance is not whether
a question relates to a main issue, but whether it will aid the jury
in appraising the witness's credibility.
8 2
The other common method of attacking a witness's credibility
is by exposing bias or motive to testify falsely. The law recognizes
that a witness's self-interest or feelings towards the defendant can
slant testimony. 8 3 Two states have incorporated this aspect of the
law into their rape shield statutes,:'" and a few others have separated
credibility issues out of generally prohibitory statutes and have left
determination of their relevance to the judge. 1' A reading of many
1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1977), all of which effectively bar
this use of sexual history evidence, except as it may relate to a previous relationship
with the accused.
180 This is similar to the issue involved in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
See notes 78-81 & 85-89 supra & accompanying text.
181 But see Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363 (1978) (deny-
ing the accused the right to rebut the victim's false statement that she was a virgin
because the shield statute did not specifically provide that such testimony was
allowable).
182 McCoMrcx, supra note 16, at § 29.
183Id. § 40; see 3A J. WinxoE, EVIDENCE §§ 948-953 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
The usual rule is that if the matter goes to bias, then extrinsic evidence is permitted
and the defense may call its own witnesses; if only to interest, then extrinsic evi-
dence is not permitted and the defense must rely only on cross-examination. The
rule is only haphazardly enforced, however, because of the difficulty of distinguish-
ing between bias and interest.
184 MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 461A (Supp. 1978) (victim's ulterior motive in
bringing charges); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.475 (1977) (bias). See People v. Mandel,
61 App. Div. 2d 563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978) (testimony of other men who had
had sexual intercourse with the complainant and psychiatric testimony relevant to
show bias); State v. Jalo, 27 Or. App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976) (holding an
early version of the Oregon shield law unconstitutional as applied to the extent
that it barred testimony offered to show the complainant's bias).
185 See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE §782 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §3508 (Michie Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-15 (1976).
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other shield laws suggests, however, that evidence of bias that also
happens to be evidence of the victim's sexual conduct is not admis-
sible. One of the clearest examples of proof of bias would be a
pattern of sexual activity with the defendant, recently ended by the
defendant. Surprisingly, one state would not allow even this testi-
mony as proof of the possibility of the complainant's retaliatory
motive. 8 6 Other states require an absence of prejudice to the
victim before this evidence is admissible.18 ' Neither restriction may
be justified in light of the common law right to expose bias.
Consider further a case in which the victim's self-interest in-
dicates a motive to testify falsely-for example, a married woman
who had an extramarital relationship a few years before and whose
husband told her he would divorce her if she had future affairs.
The defendant claims consent and an ongoing affair, and that the
complainant only pressed rape charges after discovery by her hus-
band. To lend support to this defense, the defendant wants to
disclose the prior adultery and the husband's threat. In most juris-
dictions, he would not be permitted to do so,188 in some because
sexual conduct occurring more than a year before the crime is in-
admissible.8 9 Yet the impeaching effect of this testimony, surely
the equivalent of that of the juvenile probationary status of the
witness in Davis v. Alaska,'" sets up an argument to the jury that
the witness believed she had to fabricate testimony to save herself.
3. Testimony to Rebut State's Evidence
In another obvious situation, sexual history evidence is relevant
and must be admitted-when the issue is first raised by the state.
Conceivably the prosecutor, intentionally or not, will elicit from
38
6 WAsir. REv. CoDE ANN. § 9.79.150 (1977). That state allows testimony
about a relationship with the defendant if offered to show consent, but not to attack
credibility.
187 E.g., MAss. Ai-m LAWS ch. 233, § 21B (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978);
VT. STAT. ANNs. tit. 13, § 3255 (1977).
1
8 8 See Appendix, infra. Compare State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344
A.2d 446 (1975) (evidence that complainant brought rape charge to protect herself
from mother's anger admissible) with Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 272
N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978) (evidence that complainant brought rape charge to
protect herself from boyfriend's anger inadmissible) and People v. Fritts, 72 Cal.
App. 3d 319, 140 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977) (sexual history evidence offered on theory
that complainant in child molestation and incest case had become pregnant and
accused defendant to divert attention from her pregnancy inadmissible). But see
S.C. CODE § 16-3-659.1 (Supp. 1978) (allowing evidence of sexual history that
amounts to adultery to impeach a witness).
189 E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 813.2, R. 20 (West Supp. 1979).
190 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See notes 85-89 supra & accompanying text.
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the complainant favorable testimony about her sexual history.19 1
The accused must be able to rebut this evidence. The question
is not only one of credibility,192 but has become substantive as well.
If, for example, the state offers evidence of the victim's chastity to
show the improbability that she would have consented to sexual
intercourse with the accused, it has placed that matter in issue.
Once in issue, the defense should be allowed to refute it. A few
states provide specifically for this possibility,193 but in most states
the counterevidence would be excluded.'.
4. Origin of Physical Evidence
A rape complainant's testimony is usually corroborated by
physical evidence-the presence of semen, resulting disease, or preg-
nancy.9 5 Often forcible rape cases also include testimony about the
infliction and extent of physical injury to the victim. Proof that
another man engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainant at
or near the time of the alleged rape provides an alternative source
of the physical evidence and is therefore obviously relevant. For
this reason, many states permit the defendant to introduce evidence
that someone other than himself was responsible. 96 If, for example,
191 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363 (1978) (rape
complainant testified to her chastity on direct examination); People v. Mandel, 61
App. Div. 2d 563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978) (same, at preliminary hearing).
A more difficult case is one in which the complainant gives the impression of
chastity without testifying to it directly. She might dress conservatively, act em-
barrassed when describing the rape, or talk about her family, P.T.A. membership,
or church activities. Because most jurisdictions require the jury to consider the
demeanor of witnesses in judging their credibility, see E. DmrrT & C. BLAcxm n,
FEDERAL Jury PAtcrrc.E Asm NsmucToNs § 12.01 (2d ed. 1970) (illustrative
instructions), one can argue persuasively that the accused should be allowed to
offer evidence that demonstrates the inaccuracy of such demeanor.
192 See text accompanying note 182 supra.
1 93 CAL. Evm. ConE §1103(2)(c) (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE tit. 11,
§3509(c) (Supp. 1978); MwN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3)(d) (West Supp. 1979);
Miss. CODE AxN. §§ 97-3-70(3) to 70(4) (Supp. 1978); NEv. REv. STAT. § 50.090
(1977); N.Y. Cam. Pnoc. Lw §§ 60.42(3) to .42(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978-
1979); N.D. Cmrr. CODE § 12.1-20-14(2) (1976); OxLA. STAT. AuN. tit. 22,
§750(B) (West Supp. 1978-1979); S.C. CoDp §16-3-659.1(1) (Supp. 1978);
W. VA. CODE: §61-8B-12(b) (1977). See MD. Am. CODE art. 27, §461A(a)
(Supp. 1978); WASH. BEv. CODE ANN. §9.79.150(4) (1977) (cross-examination
only).
194 See Appendix, infra.
195 See Rudstein, supra note 14, at 7-8, 37.
196 E.g., State v. Cosden, 18 Wash. App. 213, 568 P.2d 802 (1977) (dictum)
(alternative source of semen); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407(1) (b) (1978); IN.
CODE AxN. § 35-1-32.5-2 (Burns Supp. 1978) (amended 1979); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-503(5) (b) (1978). See People v. Mikula, 84 Mich. App. 108, 269 N.W.2d
195 (1978) (per curiam) (proof of previous sexual experience allowed to explain
victim's broken hymen).
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the government offers as corroborating evidence the victim's testi-
mony that she is pregnant as a result of the rape, the defendant
should be allowed to rebut with testimony that she had intercourse
with another man at about the same time. If the defendant is deny-
ing any sexual intercourse with the victim, this testimony could
help cast doubt on the state's contention that the act took place-
especially if coupled with an argument that the victim needed an
explanation for her pregnancy so that her parents or husband would
not discover her sexual relations with the other man.197 Yet at
least four jurisdictions would not permit this testimony.198 The
Federal Rules of Evidence adopt the bizarre rule that only the
presence of semen or resulting injury-not pregnancy or disease-may
be explained by the defendant. 199 Only a few jurisdictions spe-
cifically allow evidence that an injury may have occurred during
sexual activity with someone other than the defendant. 200
5. Testimony That Another Committed the Act
Closely related is evidence that someone other than the de-
fendant committed the act for which he is charged. An accused who
claims he did not commit the crime should be permitted to pro-
duce evidence that another did. In Washington v. Texas, the Court
held that a defendant had the right to call a witness to testify that
he, not the defendant, committed the crime, despite state evidentiary
rules to the contrary.201 For crimes of rape, such testimony will of
necessity involve evidence of sexual activity between the victim and
someone other than the accused. Shield statutes in some states,
however, appear to preclude this proof. Four states prohibit any
evidence of the sexual conduct of the victim with anyone other
than the defendant,202 and many others limit the situations in which
1 9 7 See notes 188-90 supra & accompanying text.
198 FED. R. EvD. 412; GA. CODE ANx. § 38-202.1 (Supp. 1979); LA. REV.
STAT. Agx. § 15:498 (West Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANNr. § 632-A:6 (Supp.
1977). See also State v. Ryan, 157 N.J. Super. 121, 384 A.2d 570 (1978) (dis-
allowing evidence of recent intercourse with man other than defendant when offered
to show consent rather than alternative source of semen).
199 See FzD. R. Evm. 412(b)(2)(A).
200 FED. R. Evm. 412. See also People v. Mandel, 61 App. Div. 2d 563, 403
N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978).
201 388 U.S. 14 (1967); see notes 66-67 supra & accompanying text.
202A" CODE tit. 12, § 12-21-203(b)-(c) (Supp. 1978); ILL. AxN. STAT. ch.
38, § 115-7(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); LA. ltv. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West
Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1977).
1980]
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sexual history evidence may be admitted to a short list, not including
this category.
20 3
6. Other Evidence of Consent
In order to bolster his claim of consent a defendant will want
to offer evidence corroborating his own testimony and, if available,
the complainant's consent in the past under similar circumstances. 204
For example, suppose the victim and defendant met at a singles
bar20-5 and after a few drinks returned to the complainant's apart-
ment, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. The defendant
claims that the woman consented, but that they later had a fight and
she threw him out. He admits hitting her during that fight. The
complainant says that she invited the defendant to her home for
coffee and that he hit and raped her. The defense has evidence
that the complainant has met other men in the same bar and vol-
untarily had sexual relations with them. Is this evidence relevant?
It may be relevant; if it amounts to proof of "habit," it is
unquestionably relevant.206  "Of the probative value of a person's
habit or custom, as showing the doing on a specific occasion of the
act which is the subject of the habit or custom, there can be no
doubt. Every day's experience and reasoning make it clear
enough." 207 A habit is a person's regular response to a particular
situation. The difficult issues are how invariable the action must
203 FED. R. Evm. 412; GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202.1 (Supp. 1979); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 461A (Supp. 1979); MIcH. Comv. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (Supp.
1979-80); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (1978); NE_. REv. STAT. § 28-321 (Supp.
1978); Omo RBv. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Page Supp. 1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3104 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); S.C. CODE § 16-3-659.1 (Supp. 1978);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2445 (Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. AxN. tit 13, § 3255 (Supp.
1979); Wis. STAT. Aim. § 972.11 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
Many other states specifically provide for the admission of this type of evidence,
e.g., ARK. STAT. Am. § 41-1810.2 (1977); Ky. REv. STAT. ANm. § 510.145 (Baldwin
Supp. 1978); Mo. Am. STAT. § 419.015 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
204 See State v. Tiff, 199 Neb. 519, 260 N.W.2d 296 (1977) (prior sexual
conduct of complainant relevant to issue of consent).
205 This setting has been used before, but, like other commentators, we have
added our own modifications. See Annburg & Rechtin, Rape Evidence Reform in
Missouri: A Remedy for the Adverse Impact of Evidentiary Rules on Rape Victims,
22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 367, 387 (1978); Rudstein, supra note 14, at 22-23; Note,
Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior Sexual His-
tory of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflections of Reality
or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HoFsTRA L. REv. 403, 404 (1975).
206 FED. R. Evm. 406; McCoMsacx, supra note 16, at § 195. Some courts
consider evidence of habit to be generally inadmissible, or admissible only in the
absence of eyewitnesses, probably because of their failure to distinguish habit evi-
dence from character evidence, which is admissible only under exceptional circum-
stances. Id. See also 1 J. WiGmonE, EviDENcE § 93 (3d ed. 1940).
207 1 J. WiGmoux, EVIDENCE § 92 (3d ed. 1940).
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be and how often it must occur to qualify as habit. The number
of times the activity must have been repeated cannot be reduced to
a set formula and will depend on the circumstances of the par-
ticular case.208  If the situation is an unusual one, only a few
responses may be sufficient to establish a habit.20 9 If the situation is
one that occurs frequently, a larger number of responses is neces-
sary.210 An activity deemed regular enough to constitute habit may
be proved either by opinion or by evidence of specific acts.211 For
the latter, a sufficient number of such acts must have occurred rea-
sonably near the time in question under similar-though not neces-
sarily identical-circumstances. 212
Evidence of a sexual habit is allowed in only a few jurisdictions
with prohibitory shield laws. 213  Most would exclude it.214 An ad-
mission by the complainant that she goes to a bar almost every
weekend, meets a stranger, and returns to her apartment and has
sexual intercourse with him would be inadmissible, despite the
similarity of that behavior to the claim of the defendant. Similarly,
the testimony of other men regarding her regular practice would
not be allowed.
Closely related to habit evidence is evidence of a common
scheme or plan. Evidence of other criminal activity, of which the
crime charged is a part, is admissible against the defendant as evi-
dence of a common plan.2 15  Despite prejudicial effect, similar
crimes may be introduced to prove that the one for which the de-
fendant is now charged was deliberate. 216  If the state may use evi-
dence of similar acts to help show that the defendant's act was
criminal, and thereby to help convict him, it is unconstitutional to
208 Id.
209 See Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65 Cal. App. 2d 737, 151
P.2d 670 (1944) (evidence that on all four previous occasions one who piloted
plane upon takeoff did so for whole of flight admissible to show likelihood of same
behavior on fifth occasion).
210 See, e.g., Howard v. Capital Transit Co., 97 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1951)
(habit of always riding the bus home from work). See Lewan, The Rationale of
Habit Evidence, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 39 (1964).
211 In a business setting, opinion is the more common, for example, regarding
the regular practice of mailing letters. See McCom'acK,, supra note 16, at § 195,
at 463-65 & nn.11, 17, & 19.
212 Id. § 190, at 465. See Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 272 N.W.2d
320 (Ct App. 1978) (one prior similar sex act excluded).
213 FLA. STAT. ANN. §794.022(2) (West 1976); NEB. BRh. STAT. §28-323
(Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(b)(3) (Supp. 1977) (amended 1979).
2 14 See Appendix, infra.
215 McCouri;c supra note 16, at § 190.
2 1 6 See United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
894 (1963); People v. Williams, 6 Cal. 2d 500, 58 P.2d 917 (1936).
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deny the accused the same right to produce evidence of the com-
plainant's pattern of similar activity to show that intercourse was
consensual.
217
To illustrate the operation of this evidentiary rule, consider the
following hypothetical situation. A woman alleges that she was
raped. The man she has accused of the act claims that she is a
prostitute who agreed to sexual relations for a fee of twenty dollars,
and afterwards, threatening to accuse him of rape, she demanded
an additional one hundred dollars. The man refused to pay the
extra amount. She had him arrested for rape, and he had her
arrested for extortion. In the extortion trial, the state would be
permitted to introduce evidence of the woman's previous sexual
conduct-the testimony of other men that, using the same method,
she had extorted money from them. When the woman is the com-
plaining witness in the rape prosecution, however, evidence of this
modus operandi would be excluded in most states.218 The facts
are the same in both cases, as is the essential issue whether the woman
is a rape victim or a would-be extortionist. Surely the relevance of
the testimony should also be identical. If the woman's sexual his-
tory is relevant enough to be admitted against her when she is a
defendant, entitled to the protections of the Constitution, then
certainly it is relevant enough to be admitted in a trial at which
she is merely a witness, entitled to no constitutional protection.219
Relevance depends on the issues that must be resolved at trial, not
on the particular crime charged.
220
217 There is some indication that the Supreme Court considers this kind of
evidence so exculpatory that preventing the accused access to it violates due process.
See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967) (involving the withholding from the
defense of evidence that the complainant regularly consented to sexual intercourse
with boys similarly situated to the defendants).
Obviously, the pattern of a complainant's sexual conduct must be similar to the
facts of the particular case. Evidence that the complainant regularly meets men
in a bar and returns with them to her apartment for sexual relations would not be
relevant if she was abducted from a supermarket and raped in the woods.
2-18 But see State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946
(1976) (dictum) (evidence that complainant is a prostitute admissible); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §609.347(3)(a) (West Supp. 1979) (evidence of sexual conduct
within the previous year admissible if tending to show common scheme or plan);
N.Y. Cumr. PRoc. LAW § 60.42(2) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) (evidence that
complainant is a prostitute admissible).
219 Cf. People v. Fritts, 72 Cal. App. 3d 319, 140 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1977) (prose-
cution allowed to introduce evidence of defendant's prior sexual conduct, but defense
not permitted to introduce similar evidence regarding complainant).
220 To carry the illustration one step further, suppose that the woman, alleging
that she was raped, instead files a civil suit for assault and battery. Because this
is not a criminal case, most shield laws would not apply. The man could, therefore,
offer evidence of the plaintiff's prior sexual conduct and the extortion scheme,
though he could not do so as a criminal defendant. Strict enforcement of shield
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Undoubtedly, evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct
will prove relevant in other situations. Each case has its own unique
facts, any one of which might raise an issue never contemplated by
the legislature. The above list of illustrations is not intended to
be exclusive. Instead, it is designed to point out the fallacy of rape
victim shield laws that prohibit the introduction of sexual conduct
evidence without giving the trial judge discretion to rule on its
relevance based on the facts of the case before him.
VII. CONCLUSION
A state is constitutionally prohibited from enacting a rape
victim shield law that limits a defendant's ability to introduce
otherwise admissible evidence. The sixth amendment rights of
confrontation and compulsory process guarantee exactly this: no
person accused of a crime may be denied the right to introduce
evidence when the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.
The state and federal governments may not legislate to alter the
rules of evidence so as to place unusual and new burdens on the
accused's ability to defend himself. Testing rape victim shield laws
against this federal constitutional standard finds many of them de-
fective.
Because sexual history evidence is potentially relevant in some
rape cases, those statutes that contain absolute prohibitions, whether
against all such evidence or only certain classes or uses of evidence,
certainly cannot be reconciled with the sixth amendment. Shield
laws also run afoul of the Constitution when they alter the tradi-
tional standard for the admissibility of evidence. The sixth amend-
ment guarantees incorporate a federal constitutional standard for
the admission and exclusion of evidence offered by the accused, and
the states cannot, therefore, require the evidence offered by rape
defendants to satisfy a stricter standard.
There is, however, nothing wrong with requiring that the
relevance of sexual history evidence be determined before trial, by
employing the traditional standard of probative value weighed
against prejudicial effect. To the extent that shield statutes limit
the accused from unfairly attacking the morality of a rape victim,
they are unobjectionable. To the extent that such statutes require
that rape victims be treated no differently from other witnesses and
that sexual conduct testimony be treated the same as any other evi-
laws, then, could produce the anomalous result of a defendant's being found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case, yet winning a civil case under a
weaker preponderance of the evidence standard.
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dence, they are certainly valid. A statute that seeks to correct
past abuses and to change the old rule automatically admitting
evidence of the rape victim's morality is laudatory. No valid con-
stitutional reason justifies singling out rape complainants for dif-
ferent treatment. But fairness to rape victims and control over
potentially prejudicial testimony can also be accomplished by a
pretrial determination of the relevance of sexual history evidence.
A valid shield law should thus read:
Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual
conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct,
and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct
may be admitted... only if, and only to the extent that,
the judge finds that the evidence is material to a fact at
issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value.
If the defendant proposes to ask any question con-
cerning [such evidence], either by direct examination or
cross-examination of any witness, the defendant must in-
form the court out of the hearing of the jury prior to asking
any such question. After this notice, the court shall con-
duct an in camera hearing ... to determine whether the
proposed evidence is admissible.
2 2 1
Times change, and the prevailing morality changes with them.
The move for equality of women has made us aware of the abuse of
rape victims in the criminal justice system. Although steps have
appropriately been taken towards protecting them, they have in
many instances come at the expense of rights guaranteed the ac-
cused. While a rape defendant should have no greater right to
present evidence than other defendants and should not be allowed
to sidetrack the search for truth by introducing irrelevant testimony
about the sexual mores of the complainant, the sixth amendment
guarantees that he will not be prevented from eliciting testimony
relevant to his defense. Shield laws must be tested against his
established rights to confront his accusers and to present his own
defense. If these laws are found wanting, they must be struck down
and rewritten to assure that the desire to protect rape victims does
not unconstitutionally hinder the ability of the accused to defend
himself.
2
2 1Th. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Substantially similar
shield laws are HAw. REV. STAT. § 707-742 (Supp. 1978); IDAHo CODE § 18-6105
(Supp. 1979); KA. STAT. ANN. § 60-447a (Vernon Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-16 (1978); R.I. B. CGml. P. 26.3. See also COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-407
(1978); FI.A. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West Supp. 1978).
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APPENDIX
COMPARATIVE TABLES OF RAPE VIcTIM SHIELD STATUTES
The following tables compare the forty-six rape victim shield
statutes according to their general approach and specific provisions.
Some degree of precision has been sacrificed in order to reduce
often lengthy statutes into tabular form.
Tables 1 to 3 include those statutes that generally allow sexual
history evidence. The statutes in Table 1 admit sexual history
testimony on the same basis as other evidence, though some require
hearings. Those in Table 2 require hearings for some specified
types or uses of sexual history evidence. Table 3 lists statutes that
follow the pattern of admitting such evidence after a hearing and
on a finding of relevance, but they specify a few situations in which
the evidence may not be admitted or may not be found to be
relevant.
Tables 4 and 5 include the most restrictive statutes, which set
up a general rule that sexual history evidence may not be admitted.
Table 4 covers those statutes allowing the trial judge no discretion-
the statute declares sexual conduct evidence inadmissible, except for
a few situations in which it will be admissible. Table 5 includes
the most restrictive statutes, those that prohibit sexual history
evidence except in a few limited situations; even for those excep-
tions, the judge may exclude the evidence after a hearing.
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TABLE 1
Statutes that admit sexual history evidence merely on a showing of relevance and

















Tex. Penal Code Ann.










Before or during trial.
Before trial (motion due










Before trial (motion due
ten days before trial).
Test for Admissibility
Relevant and not otherwise
inadmissible.
Relevancy.a.









a Although the statute does not specify that relevance must outweigh prejudice,
judges probably interpret it that way.
b Specifically gives the state the right to introduce evidence of sexual conduct
without a hearing.
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TABLE 2
Statutes that generally allow sexual history evidence but require a hearing on admissibility
for some uses of this evidence. The evidence admissible without a hearing must
satisfy the traditional requirement that relevance outweigh prejudice.
Statute Evidence Admissible Evidence Admissible Test for






























prostitution convic-tions within past
three years; rebuttal
of state's evidence of
complainant's

















If offered to show
consent, evidence
must be admissible in




a Although the statute does not specify
judges probably interpret it that way.
that relevance must outweigh prejudicial effect,
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TABLE 3
Statutes that give the trial judge general discretion to admit sexual history evidence
after a hearing, but limit that discretion in a few situations.
Statute Hearing Test for Situations When Evi-





§ 782 (West Supp.
1979).a














































one year before crime
(rebuttable
presumption).
Some types of conduct
offered to show
consent, see Table 4
infra.
Some types of conduct
offered to show
consent, see Table 4
infra.
Conduct with persons
other than the accused
occurring more than













Some types of conduct
offered to show
consent, see Table 4
infra.
a This statute applies only to evidence offered to impeach the complainant's credibility.
A companion statute covers evidence offered on the consent issue, see Table 4 infra.
b This statute applies only to evidence offered to show consent. A companion statute
covers evidence offered to impeach the complainants credibility, see Table 4 infra.
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TABLE 4
Statutes that generally prohibit the introduction of sexual history evidence except in a fewnarrowly defined circumstances. These statutes involve io discretion: sexual history evidence
is either admissible or prohibited. None of these statutes draws any distinction between
reputation evidence, opinion evidence, and evidence of specific acts.
Statute Situations in Which Sexual Conduct Is Admissible
Conduct With As Rebuttal, if State Other
Accused Raises Issue of
Victim's Conduct







tit. 11, § 3509
(Supp. 1978).8a
Ill. Ann. Stat
ch. 38, § 115-7
(Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979).





















































Sexual conduct of the
victim in the presence
of the accusem
a This statute applies only to evidence offered to show consent. A companion statute
covers evidence offered to impeach the complainant's credibility, see Table 3 supra.
b This statute applies only to evidence offered to impeach the complainant's credibility.
A companion statute covers evidence offered to show consent, see Table 3 supra.
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